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Socialism Goes Global: Decolonization and the Making of
a New Culture of Internationalism in Socialist Hungary,
1956–1989*
James Mark and Péter Apor
University of Exeter and Institute of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
In the late 1950s,Hungarian elites stepped up their attempts to open up the country
to Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Wishing to escape the diplomatic
isolation that had followed international condemnation of the suppression of the
1956 revolt and to steer their economy away from Stalinist-era autarkic develop-
ment, elites looked to develop trade links with what would later be called the
“global South.”1 This engagement was also a product of rapid Stalinist-era
industrialization: it provided Eastern Bloc states with the sense of possessing a
developed socialist modernity that could now be exported to countries that were
throwing off European or American imperialism and choosing socialist—or at
least noncapitalist—forms of development.2 Warsaw Pact countries were also work-
ing within a new framework provided by the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev
and a restructured foreign affairs corps were questioning both the dominant late
Stalinist idea that there was only one pattern for the development of socialism
and its earlier—often racially inﬂected—thinking that such modernization might
not be possible in the less developed world.3 Led by the ﬁrm pro-Khrushchevite
1 On policies to break Hungary’s isolation, see György Péteri, “Transsystemic Fanta-
sies: Counterrevolutionary Hungary at Brussels Expo ’58,” Journal of Contemporary
History 47, no. 1 ð2012Þ: 137–60.
2 For a classic statement about exporting Hungarian expertise, see József Bognár,
“Science and Its Application in Developing Countries,” New Hungarian Quarterly 4,
no. 11 ð1963Þ: 17–18.
3 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making
of Our Times ðCambridge, 2005Þ, 166–67; Fred Halliday, “Third World Socialism: 1989
and After,” in The Global 1989: Continuity and Change on World Politics, ed. George
Lawson, Chris Armbruster, and Michael Cox ðCambridge, 2010Þ, 117–18; Andreas
Hilger, “The Soviet Union and India: The Khrushchev Era and Its Aftermath until
1966,” in Indo-Soviet Relations Collection: The Khrushchev Years, ed. Andreas Hilger,
Anna Locher, Roland Popp, Shana Goldberg, and Matthias Pintsch ð2009Þ, 1–14, http://
www.php.isn.ethz.ch.
* James Mark acknowledges the support of a British AcademyMid-Career Fellowship
ð2013Þ and, with Péter Apor, fellowships at the Imre Kertész Kolleg, Jena ð2012Þ.
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János Kádár and foreign minister Endre Sík ð1958–61Þ, a committed Africanist
of long standing, Hungary enthusiastically followed this line.4 In 1959–60 a Ra-
dio Free Europe research analyst, fearing communist inﬁltration in the develop-
ing world, counted sixty-one ofﬁcial Hungarian “missions” to developing coun-
tries. His list included workers installing technology in theMiddle East, building
factories and power stations in Egypt, sending commercial delegations to Ghana
and Guinea, managing public bus trafﬁc in Conakry, and assisting hospital work
in the Arabic peninsula, as well as intellectuals and technical professionals vis-
iting the Indian cinema industry and writers traveling to Latin America.5
Yet Hungary’s new engagement with an “anti-imperialist world” was not only
a matter of external support. Whereas the end of empire did not become a central
feature of Western European political cultures—indeed, it has been argued that
the very term “decolonization” was used to hide the conﬂicts behind, and stress
the generous nature of, the handover of power—the struggles that achieved na-
tional independence were brought to the center of elite, intellectual, and popular
cultures of state socialist Eastern Europe.6 Over the next two decades, accounts of
Third World revolutions, and Hungarians’ close connections to them, would play
a major role in socialist mass culture. Most commonly crafted to appeal to a new
generation, these stories related a bright global future for socialism, in which
Hungarian youth could play a part.7 This development was not driven just by the
party elite and state institutions, however: a range of other actors—from conser-
vative populists to radical leftists to workers who volunteered to ﬁght in Viet-
nam—also contributed to the construction of this new Third Worldist culture.
In that sense, this story is partly illustrative of what Melinda Kalmár and András
Mink have called Kádár’s late socialist “simulated public sphere,” a space where
citizens were given access to more diverse political information and allowed
greater leeway in political expression than had been possible under Stalinism.8
4 Endre Sík studied in Moscow in the 1920s and later taught in the African department
of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East. In 1930, he published The Racial
Question and Marxism ðin Russian, translated into Hungarian in 1971Þ. He also published
the four-volumeHistory of Black Africa ðFekete-Afrika történeteÞ between 1964 and 1973.
These volumes were translated into English and French. For his account of Hungary’s
enthuasiastic support for African independence, see his professional autobiography, Bem
rakparti évek ðBudapest, 1970Þ, 213–19.
5 Radio Free Europe Background Report, “Hungarian Visits to the Underdeveloped
Countries,” Open Society Archives, Budapest [HU OSA] 31-1-8.
6 See Stuart Ward, “The European Provenance of Decolonization,” Past & Present,
no. 230 (February 2016), forthcoming.
7 On the relationship between foreign policy and internal legitimacy for a socialist state,
see Robert Niebuhr, “Nonalignment as Yugoslavia’s Answer to Bloc Politics,” Journal of
Cold War Studies 13, no. 1 ð2011Þ: 146–79.
8 Melinda Kalmár, Ennivaló és hozomány: A kora kádárizmus ideológiája ðBudapest,
1998Þ, 64–78; András Mink, “A kesudió ügy,” Beszélő 3 ð1997Þ: 7–8.
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However, they argued, this occurred only insofar as it ultimately helped to
reinforce ofﬁcial discourse, keep public opinion within tolerated limits, and, in
so doing, achieve greater social integration than would be possible under a more
punitive authoritarianism. Yet not all these social and intellectual contributions
can be considered integrative: this culture of international connection and soli-
darity was also capable of sparking disruptive projects “from below” that con-
tested the state’s readings of global revolution and domesticated its ideas in
politically disruptive forms that challenged ofﬁcial aspirations for the future of
socialism at home.
This struggle over the meaning of this new internationalism was understood
by contemporaries as a generational one—even if, in reality, the intellectual po-
sitions taken by participants in these debates crossed over age-determined lines.
Many of these problematic alternative readings were pinned on a younger gen-
eration’s youthful romanticism, understood by elites as a product of their lack of
knowledge and experience of the everyday struggles of wartime antifascism and
postwar rebuilding.9 By the late 1960s, institutions of the state clamped down on
the use of anti-imperialist struggles abroad to generate critiques of socialism at
home: the story told here is thus also illustrative of the problems an Eastern Bloc
state faced policing the boundaries of this revived internationalism. The sources
created by this clash of perspectives—and by the state’s near constant attempt to
assess and regulate popular attitudes about the outside world, particularly among
youth—provide the main evidence base for this work: these include the opinion
surveys, surveillance assessments, and “mood reports” produced by institutions
such as the Communist Youth League and the youth and intellectual journals
where the struggles of the decolonizing world could be popularized and, in some
cases, debated.10 To these are added the voices of those young activists who were
shaped politically by this internationalist socialist culture, heard through their
diaries and memoirs and through eighty oral history interviews conducted with
those involved in ofﬁcial and less ofﬁcial political and cultural activisms in the
1960s and 1970s.11
9 For more on this generational divide, see Péter Apor and James Mark, “Mobilizing
Generation: The Idea of 1968 in Hungary,” in Talkin’ ’bout My Generation: Conflicts of
Generation Building and Europe’s 1968, ed. Anna von der Goltz ðGöttingen, 2011Þ, 99–
118.
10 The main youth journals in this context were Világ Ifjúsága ðWorld youthÞ and Ifjú
Kommunista ðYoung CommunistÞ; the main intellectual journals were Társadalmi Szemle
andKritika. ThirdWorldist issues could also be found inmany local university newspapers
and journals in this period.
11 These were conducted as part of the ðUKÞ Arts and Humanities Research Council–
funded “Around 1968: Activism, Networks, Trajectories” project. Interviews were carried
out with eighty individuals drawn from six activist groups of the period: Maoists, members
of the Communist Youth League Reform Movement, Marxist Revisionists, radical Catho-
lics, the Balatonboglár group, and the Orfeo cultural collective.
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In recent years, historians and other scholars have become increasingly inter-
ested in how, in the late 1950s, Eastern Bloc nations opened up their “mass
imaginations”: how socialist culture became infused with knowledge of the wider
world both to a degree and with a nuance unknown in the Stalinist period.
Nevertheless, most of these investigations have focused on how newly complex
images of the West were negotiated in socialist culture.12 There has been very
little interest in the role of the decolonizing world in the imagination of post-
Stalinist Eastern Europe.13 Yet Hungary, alongside other European state socialist
countries, did experience—in common with the West in this period—political,
activist, and youth cultures ever more deﬁned through contact with, and reﬂection
on, politics and cultures from across the world.14 Direct encounters with the
decolonizing and postcolonial world played a limited role: greater numbers were
crossing the Iron Curtain to Western Europe in this period, but only a limited
cohort were able to travel to sites of anti-imperialist revolution beyond Europe.15
12 Ervin Csizmadia, Diskurzus és diktatúra: A magyar értelmiség vitái Nyugat-
Európáról a késő Kádár-rendszerben ðBudapest, 2001Þ, 71–81. See, in a Soviet context,
Anne E. Gorsuch, “From Iron Curtain to Silver Screen: Imagining the West in the
Khrushchev Era,” in Imagining the West in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, ed.
György Péteri ðPittsburgh, 2010Þ, esp. 170–71.
13 As exceptions, see Jennifer Hosek, Sun, Sex and Socialism: Cuba in the German
Imaginary ðToronto, 2012Þ; Marcus Kenzler, Der Blick in die andere Welt: Einflüsse
Lateinamerikas auf die Bildende Kunst der DDR ðBerlin, 2012Þ; Tobias Rupprecht, Soviet
Internationalism after Stalin (Cambridge, 2015); Anne Gorsuch, “‘Cuba, My Love’: The
Romance of Revolutionary Cuba in the Soviet Sixties,” American Historical Review 120,
no. 2 (2015): 497–526. Although some have acknowledged the importance of linkages
with the Third World at a political level, there has often been an assumption that this new
form of communist internationalism had little social resonance. Most work on Second
World and Third World linkages or transfer has concerned diplomacy, politics, or eco-
nomics; see the survey in David C. Engerman, “The Second World’s Third World,”
Kritika 12, no. 1 ð2011Þ: 183–211; see also, e.g., Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, Red Globalisa-
tion: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev
ðCambridge, 2014Þ; Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War ðChicago,
1996Þ; MaximMatusevich, No Easy Row for a Russian Hoe: Ideology and Pragmatism in
Nigerian-Soviet Relations, 1960–1991 ðTrenton, NJ, 2003Þ; Sergey Mazov, A Distant
Front in the ColdWar: The USSR inWest Africa and the Congo, 1956–1964 ðWashington,
DC, 2010Þ; Petr Zídek and Karel Sieber, Československo a subsaharská Afrika v letech
1948–1989 ðPrague, 2007Þ; Hana Bortlová, Československo a Kuba v letech 1959–1962
ðPrague, 2011Þ.
14 Some work compares Western and Eastern European forms of transnational youth
and activist culture from the 1960s: see, e.g., James Mark, Nigel Townson, and Polymeris
Voglis, “Inspirations,” and James Mark and Anna von der Goltz, “Encounters,” both in
Europe’s 1968: Voices of Revolt, ed. Robert Gildea, James Mark, and Anette Warring
ðOxford, 2013Þ, 72–103, and 131–63.
15 It should be noted that elite politicians, intellectuals, and working-class factory and
youth delegations were traveling to socialist countries outside Europe in the 1960s. Far
more, however, were traveling westward as part of a policy of new economic openness
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Nevertheless, the presence in the Eastern Bloc of exiles, workers, or students from
other world regions was important for some.16 For the most part, however, it was
socialist mass media, intellectual journals, national commemorative events, edu-
cational initiatives, and solidarity movements that most profoundly shaped this
new socialist political culture—one in which the revolutions in Latin America or
freedom struggles in Africa and Southeast Asia played an increasingly important
role in enabling a second generation of socialist citizens to develop new political
subjectivities and identities at home. Indeed, it may be that this new culture was
especially powerful precisely because real encounter was so rare: thus these
cultural imaginaries, distanced from the complexities of the various international
socialist movements that inspired them, could be more easily accommodated to
the ideological needs of domestic political or cultural projects.17
I. Opportunities
A. Reactivating Youth Commitment
From the late 1950s, knowledge of the decolonizing and developing world was
primarily aimed at a new generation of socialist subjects. Over the following two
decades, the institutions connected with youth played the most signiﬁcant roles in
constructing an internationalist culture that not only communicated ofﬁcial
16 On these “domestic encounters,” see, e.g., Quinn Slobodian, Foreign Front: Third
World Politics in Sixties West Germany ðDurham, NC, 2012Þ; Maxim Matusevich, “An
Exotic Subversive: Africa, Africans and the Soviet Everyday,” Race & Class 49, no. 4
ð2008Þ: 57–81.
17 This work will focus for the most part on the reception of socialist and anti-
imperialist movements by Hungarians. It does not deal with this encounter from the
perspective of actors from the decolonizing world.
to “developed” countries. The Hungarian government encouraged study trips and schol-
arships for Hungarian professionals and scholars and made diplomatic efforts to institu-
tionalize these contacts between 1961 and 1969, ﬁrst with France and then with Germany
and the United States. See Katalin Somlai, “Ösztöndíjjal Nyugatra a hatvanas években: Az
Országos Ösztöndíj Tanács felállítása” ½To the West with a scholarship: The establishment
of the National Council of Scholarships, in Kádárizmus: Mélyfúrások, ed. János Tischler
ðBudapest, 2009Þ, 273–314. On the growth of bilateral contacts and intellectual exchange
with Western Europe after the 1956 revolution, see Anikó Macher, “Hungarian Cultural
Diplomacy, 1957–1963: Echoes ofWestern Cultural Activity in a Communist Country,” in
Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy, ed. Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C.
Donfried ðOxford, 2010Þ, 75–108. From1964, for instance, Hungarian economists increas-
ingly traveled to the United States on Ford fellowships. See Joanna Bockman,Markets in
the Name of Socialism: The Left-Wing Origins of Neoliberalism ðStanford, CA, 2011Þ,
127–29. In 1971, 1.2 million Hungarians traveled abroad, and 216,000 of those went to the
West: CURT, “Hungarian Travel Opportunities to the West,” July 7, 1972 ðEERA/Hun-
garian UnitÞ. On the 1980s as the “true transnational period,” see Padraic Kenney, “Borders
Breached: The Transnational in Eastern Europe since Solidarity,” Journal of Modern
European History 8, no. 2 ð2010Þ: 184–87.
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ideological positions on a new socialist world but also nurtured a culture of
transnational activist solidarity from below. At the center of this project stood the
Communist Youth League ðKommunista Ifjúsági Szövetség, or KISZÞ: a new
youth organization established after the 1956 revolution to reinvigorate the
process of socializing those ages 14–30 into the norms of a developed socialist
society.18 From early 1960, league-sponsored magazines such as Világ Ifjúsága
ðWorld youthÞ and Ifjú Kommunista ðYoung CommunistÞ frequently communi-
cated new anti-imperialist struggles to the young. In their accounts, a new
generation was turning to socialist construction across the world. The Cuban
revolution of 1959 had the ﬁrst starring role: it was presented in numerous articles
as evidence that LatinAmerica’s youngwould bring socialism to their continent—
a struggle that Hungarian youth had a responsibility to support.19 The Communist
Youth League helped build global revolution into the socialist calendar too. From
1956 onward, it took the lead in organizing, each year on April 24, the “day of
anticolonialism and for struggling youth”—a major nationally coordinated event
that explicitly connected youth socialization and the ﬁghts against Western im-
perialism.20 It also helped to manage the festivities held every January to mark the
anniversary of the Cuban revolution, which by the early 1960s had become a
regular feature of the socialist calendar.21 When Che Guevara visited Hungary in
December 1961, it was the annual conference of the Communist Youth in
Budapest that publicly showcased him to the Hungarian population ðﬁg. 1Þ.22
18 LászlóKürti, Youth and the State inHungary ðLondon, 2002Þ, 102.Within ﬁve years
of the league’s founding, its membership had reached 708,000.
19 Moreover, developing Soviet-Cuban relations were presented as an evolving model
for cooperation between Third World anticolonial movements and the Socialist Bloc as a
whole. See Adolfo Rivero, “A felszabadító harcok és a leszerelés” ½Wars of independence
and disarmament, Világ Ifjúsága 9 ðMarch 1960Þ: 3; Luis Ortega, “A ﬁatal latin-amerikai
nemzedék” ½The young Latin American generation, Világ If júsága 9 ðJuly 1960Þ: 3;
“Latin-Amerikából jelentik” ½Reports from Latin America, If jú Kommunista, July 1962,
31. Társadalmi Szemle included a comprehensive review of the ﬁrst eighteenmonths of the
Cuban revolution in its July 1960 issue.
20 “Szolidaritás” [Solidarity], If jú Kommunista 18, no. 4 ðApril 1974Þ: 14. In most
years, If jú Kommunista included an article explaining the origins of this day. According to
these accounts, it was ﬁrst held on February 21, 1947, organized by Asian students in
response to the Bombay navy mutiny against the British a year earlier. It was taken up in
the Socialist Bloc, and then, eight years later, the date of commemoration was changed to
celebrate the last day of the Bandung Conference on April 24, 1955.
21 To mark the third anniversary, the Cuban revolution was celebrated through public
addresses and a ﬁlm festival, and a Hungarian delegation was sent to Cuba to express
solidarity with the revolution: Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára ðHungarian
National Archive, hereafter cited as MNLOLÞ 288/5/253, 84, 93.
22 “Fegyver, munka, tanulás” [Weapons, work, learning],Magyar Ifjúság, December 24,
1960; If jú Kommunista, February 1961, back cover.
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Fig. 1.—Che Guevara delivers a speech to the annual congress of the Hungarian
Communist Youth League, December 18, 1960 ðIfjúkommunista [January 1961]: 2Þ.
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A knowledge of socialism’s increasingly global reach was quickly embedded
in education too. Against the background of not only the Cuban Revolution but
also the independence in 1960 of seventeen states in Africa whose leaders, it was
hoped, would build socialism, the Communist Youth League’s internationalist
educational and political work was stepped up. World Map Circles ð“Világ
térképe e lőtt” körÞ became a regular feature of a new anticolonial education di-
rected at all high school and university students. These sought to instill in youth
an awareness of the geographical extent of the noncapitalist world and the belief
that socialism was on its way to becoming the dominant “world system.”23 The
ideological power of viewing these images of an ever-expanding red coloring on
the world map was recalled in the autobiography of author György Dalos, a
former Maoist who reﬂected from an ironic distance on how such an education in
the early 1960s had given him great conﬁdence as a young man in the future of
socialism: “First of all the international conditions were conducive to the reali-
zation of our plans. In our vision the world map was adorned with little ﬂags
marking the front lines ½of the socialist struggle . . . we panned over the ever-
spreading territory—from Shanghai to Plauen—and then across to the cayman-
shaped ‘land of the free’ of the Americas ½i.e., Cuba.”24
For many activists, the claim that the end of Western European empires might
herald the “last phase of capitalism” was not inconceivable in the early 1960s.
The predictions that Lenin set out in his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of
Capitalism ð1920Þ—that the greatest threat to the capitalist system would come
from the exploited in the colonies and semicolonies on its margins—appeared
now to be taking real historical form. The Soviet leader Khrushchev in particular
ﬁrmly believed that socialist revolutions, national liberation movements, and
democratic revolution were merging into “a single revolutionary world process
undermining and destroying capitalism.”25 The collapse of European empires
was presented as having ushered in a new stage in world history, enabling a
23 Kézikönyv: A Kisz politikai körök vezetői részére 1960–1 ½Handbook for the
leaders of KISZ political groups. On the role of geographers in conceptualizing this new
anti-imperialist world, see Ferenc Koch, “A nacionalizmus elleni harc irányelvei a föl-
drajzban” [The methods of ﬁghting against nationalism in geography], Felsőoktatási
Szemle 10, no. 9 ðOctober 1960Þ: 605.
24 György Dalos, Hosszú menetelés, rövid tanfolyam ½The long march: A short course
ðBudapest, 1989Þ, 29. Dalos’s title refers to the fact that this is a history ða “short course,”
Stalin’s standardized history of the communist movementÞ of his engagement with
Maoism ðhence his reference to the Chinese communists’ “long march”Þ. The author,
while providing an in-depth and nuanced account of his engagement with leftist politics
in 1960s Hungary, nevertheless wished to distance his present identity from his previous
self. His title achieved this through ironic distance ðsignaled in the humorous juxtaposition
of the Soviet and Chinese termsÞ and through emphazising the brevity ðthe “short course”Þ
of his ultraradical period.
25 Quoted in Alfred B. Evans, Soviet Marxism-Leninism: The Decline of an Ideology
ðWestport, CT, 1993Þ, 73.
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fundamental renewal of the traditions of European socialism.26 The October
revolution had come alive again in the jungles of Southeast Asia, where, the
youth press explained, the Vietnamese partisans drew strength from the knowl-
edge that they were following in the footsteps of the Soviets.27 The ideas that a
new era of global struggle between imperialism and socialism had begun and that
a rapidly expanding socialist world could be victorious became a central part of
political life.28 Hungarian youth were encouraged to perceive themselves as
members of a transnational army of progress and revolution that was growing in
strength.29
The reasons for this connection between youth and anti-imperialism can be
found in a perceived crisis in, and hopes for, the education of a second socialist
generation. On the one hand, elites feared that the youth had been insufﬁciently
socialized into the traditions of struggle, had become ideologically demobilized
following the experience of Stalinism and the violent suppression of reform
socialism in 1956, and were skeptical about the future of the project at home.30
On the other, they invested hopes in a newgenerationwho could complete the “cul-
tural construction” of socialism. In the early 1960s, it was commonly believed
that while the ﬁrst phase of the economic and political construction of socialism
had been completed, cultural change had been held up: this was often blamed
on the entrenched mentalities of an older generation “tarnished” in their early
lives by the experience of capitalism.31 Many party leaders, ideologues, and
26 The Soviet bloc held to the idea of the “correlation of forces,” which assumed a
progressive direction for socialism in the decolonizing world; see Fred Halliday, “Third
World Socialism: 1989 and After,” in The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World
Politics, ed. George Lawson ðCambridge, 2010Þ, 118.
28 For one of the ﬁrst substantial intellectual manifestations of this in Hungary, see
István Kende, A gyarmati rendszer felbomlása ½The break-up of the colonial system
ðBudapest, 1961Þ. For the appeal of the “growing world system” narrative in a contem-
porary propaganda diafilm ðﬁlmstripÞ, see László Bácskai, A szocialista világrendszer
ðBudapest: Magyar Diaﬁlmgyártó Vállalat, 1967Þ, http://dia.osaarchivum.org/public
/index.php?fs52486&search52&page54. A range of terms were used in the early to
mid-1960s, such as a szocialista világrendszer ðthe socialist world systemÞ and békeszerető
erők ðpeace-loving forcesÞ, which were engaged in nemzetközi osztályharc ðinternational
class struggleÞ. On the rise and fall of conﬁdence in the idea of a socialist world system,
see Sara Lorenzini, “Comecon and the South in the Years of Détente,” European Review
of History 21, no. 2 ðApril 2014Þ: 183–99.
29 On the idea of a global Socialist Bloc on the rise, see “A nemzetközi kapcsolatok
alakulásáról” [The future of international relations], A JövőMérnöke, September 29, 1963.
30 “Jelentés a diákif júság eszmei-politikai, világnézeti és erkölcsi arculatával kapcso-
latos néhány problémáról” [Report on a few problems related to the political-ideological
and moral attitudes of youth], Politikatörténeti és Szakszervezeti Levéltár [Archives of
Political History and Trade Unions, hereafter cited as PSL] 289. f. 13/1963/33.őe.
31 For a later reﬂection on the “lag in ‘cultural construction,’” see Dalos, Hosszú
menetelés, 28–29.
27 “MG,” “November 7. ünnepén” [Celebrating November 7], If jú Kommunista,
October 1966.
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intellectuals hoped that revolutions in distant lands would provide inspiring
images of the future of socialism that domestic exemplars were unable to match
and that these might profoundly move the ideological inclinations of a younger
cohort toward a deeper cultural identiﬁcation with socialism as a modern,
growing, and now truly global ideology.32
Indeed, many young activists of the 1960s remembered these struggles—and
in particular the struggle in Cuba—as essential to their political socialization in a
system where domestic progressive traditions appeared stale or compromised.
László Trencsényi, who was to become an important ﬁgure in the KISZ reform
movement in the late 1960s, recalled in an oral history interview that during
the Cuban crisis . . . there was this time when the classroom door suddenly opened, and the
class above us came in through the door . . . and they said that we would go on a protest:
“Stop the clocks! There’s going to be a protest against the blockade of Cuba.”And all of us
young ones streamed out. At last there was some kind of revolutionary situation, there was
something happening to us. Yes, I had been an upstanding pioneer in December 1957,
defending the honor of my red necktie, but now, at last, here was the revolution proper!
And from our language lesson we pushed and shoved our way out into the hallway, where
we had to condemn American imperialism, which we did happily, clapping with abandon,
“Out of Cuba, Yankees no!” as we went.33
This new culture was also encouraged by those from other intellectual traditions
whose unconventional contributions could simultaneously critique and reinforce
the party leadership’s new transnational appeals. One of the ﬁrst alternative
promoters was Sándor Csoóri, a young populist intellectual from a peasant
background who in 1961 traveled to Cuba for the ﬁrst time. His account of this
trip—printed in the youth, intellectual, and popular press and eventually pub-
lished as hisKubai napló ðCuban diaryÞ in 1965—would be inﬂuential in shaping
the broader cult of the Cuban revolution in the early to mid-1960s.34 Csoóri was
one of the many populist intellectuals who made their peace with the regime
following the defeat of the 1956 revolution. They accepted the regime’s offer to
forget their involvement in the uprising, and some—such as leading populist
32 The most prominent public promoters of this new culture were, e.g., DeputyMinister
and then Minister of Culture György Aczél, the young populist intellectual Sándor Csoóri,
the academic/“peace researcher” István Kende, Foreign Minister Endre Sík, Communist
Youth leader and writer Gábor Karczag, and political journalists and writers György Máté
and György Makai.
33 László Trencsényi, interview conducted by Péter Apor, Budapest, January 15, 2009.
34 See Sándor Csoóri, Kubai napló ðBudapest, 1965Þ, and also the earlier serialization
“Kubai útinapló” ½Travel report from Cuba, published as three parts in Új Írás 3
ðSeptember 1963Þ: 1030–41,Új Írás ðNovember 1963Þ: 1287–99, andÚj Írás ðDecember
1963Þ, 1458–72. Csoóri had difﬁculties publishing the book, and he would later claim that
this was due not to his political readings of the Cuban revolution, which were tolerated but
rather to his overly sexualized representations of Cuban women.
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writers Gyula Illyés and László Németh—made public declarations in which they
acclaimed the achievements of the socialist system under János Kádár. In return,
from the beginning of the 1960s, state-sponsored publishing houses guaranteed
opportunities for them.35 Csoóri himself viewed Western forms of individualistic
capitalism as the greater threat to rural Hungary and the state socialist status quo
as the lesser evil. In Cuba, he found an imaginative and inspiring space through
which he could rethink the national project at home. Rejecting the party’s ofﬁcial
image of Cuba as a land of modern socialist construction, Csoóri rather repre-
sented it as an idealized peasant society in an independent country that had now
chosen—through its revolution—to resist the excessive materialism of the mod-
ern world. The Cuban revolution could be celebrated as anticapitalist, free from
the technological oversophistication and acquisitiveness of the capitalist West,
and valuing “genuine community.”36
B. Taming Anticommunist Nationalism
This internationalist culture was shaped by another fear: that of the impact of
anticommunist nationalism on youth. Most of the post-1956 elite concurred that
the “national communism” espoused by Imre Nagy—prime minister from 1953
and during the 1956 revolution itself—was a “bourgeois deviation” that had in
effect stoked reactionary nationalist resistance to Communism and opened up the
country to the inﬂuence of “counterrevolutionary forces.”37 This ideology, it was
commonly argued, had particularly affected youth, who, as a consequence, had
taken part in the 1956 uprising in large numbers, supposedly tricked into believ-
ing that the presence of the Soviets and the RedArmywas inimical to the interests
of the Hungarian nation.38 After the uprising’s suppression, multiple surveys were
35 On the relationship between populist writers and the regime after 1956, see Éva
Standeisky, “Tükrök: Népi írok, parasztpárti politikusok és a hatalom, 1960–1973,” in
Múlt századi hétköznapok: Tanulmányok a Kádár-korszak kiakulásának időszakáról, ed.
János M. Rainer ðBudapest, 2003Þ, 299–330.
36 On this outlook, see Albert Tezla, Ocean at the Window: Hungarian Prose and
Poetry since 1945 ðMinneapolis, 1983Þ, 280.
37 See the position of First Secretary János Kádár inMNLOLM-KS 288/5/113, 3–4, 5,
14. This position was established in Kádár’s declaration of November 6, 1956, on behalf of
a provisional central committee. It stated that the group was breaking with Nagy’s
government, which, “having assumed the positions of nationalism and chauvinism, have
opened up the way for counterrevolutionary forces.”
38 On the link between youth, nationalism, and involvement in the 1956 uprising, see,
e.g., MartinMevius, Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins
of Socialist Patriotism ðOxford, 2005Þ, 267; Nóra Dikán Némethné, Róbert Szabó, and
István Vida, eds., Vidéki diákmozgalmak 1956-ban ðBudapest, 2004Þ; and László Eörsi,
Corvinisták, 1956: A VIII. kerület fegyveres csoportjai ðBudapest, 2001Þ. On this connec-
tion between youth and 1956 in elite minds, see László Kürti, Youth and the State in
Hungary ðLondon, 2002Þ, 100–102; Milán Pap, “‘A nép és a szülőföld igaz szeretete’—a
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conducted into nationalist outlooks of youth in educational journals.39 The
ministry of the interior repeatedly called for special police measures to protect
the young from the continued threat of this ideology—an approach that would be
formalized as “antinationalist youth protection” in the 1960s.40 From 1959
onward—evidenced in speeches of leading politicians, debates in the party
journal Társadalmi Szemle, and the May 1959 National Pedagogical Confer-
ence—there was an increasing interest in how “bourgeois nationalism” could be
countered through a reinvigorated “socialist patriotism.”41 In this conception, a
true patriotism could be felt only by those who identiﬁed with working-class
interests and socialism and who respected the procession of historical ﬁgures—
such as peasant rebels, heroes and martyrs of the 1848 revolutions, and artists and
writers—who had nursed the progressive traditions of the Hungarian people in
advance of the victory of the socialist regime.42
By the early 1960s, party intellectuals were arguing that Hungarian youth
needed a patriotism that required them to look beyond the country’s borders to
the struggles of the anticolonial world.43 The party’s propaganda section,
branches of the Communist Youth League, and public educational institutions
began to promote a socialist patriotism that consciously linked contemporary
anti-imperialist struggles to the progressive national tradition that the socialist
state had been promoting in education and culture since the late 1940s.44 It was
szocialista hazaﬁság fogalma a Kádár-rendszerben,” Politikatudományi Szemle, no. 1
ð2013Þ: 72.
39 See, e.g., the bimonthly publication of the Ministry of Education ðBudapestÞ, Törté-
nelemtanítás 6 ð1960Þ.
40 On the relationship between 1956 and youth protection in the 1960s, see Sándor
Horváth, Kádár gyermekei: If júsági lázadás a hatvanas években ðBudapest, 2009Þ, 65,
75–76.
41 MNLOL 288/5/118, 4, 61; “A burzsoá nacionalizmusról és a szocialista hazaﬁságról
ðTézisekÞ” ½Concerning bourgeois nationalism and socialist patriotism ðThesesÞ, Társa-
dalmi Szemle 14 ðJuly–August 1959Þ: 11–39; “A nacionalizmus elleni harc néhány
kérdéséről ðTézisekÞ” ½Aspects of the struggle against nationalism ðThesesÞ, MNLOL
M-KS 288/5/113, 42–54.
42 See contemporary materials aimed at the young, such as the Communist Youth
League brochure Ki az igazi hazafi? ½Who is the real patriot? ð1957Þ. The important his-
torical ﬁgures it lists are Dózsa, Mészáros, Batsányi, Verseghy, Csokonai, Martinovics,
Hajnóczi ðsicÞ, Kölcsey, Petőﬁ, Vörösmarty, Arany, Táncsics, Vajda, Ady, and József
Attila. See Pap, “‘A nép és a szülőföld igaz szeretete,” 71. See also Ferenc Baktai, Ki a
hazafi? ½Who is a patriot? ðBudapest, 1962Þ.
43 One ofmost high-proﬁle exampleswas a keynote speech given onFebruary 15, 1961,
by Miklós Óvári, ideologue and member of the Central Committee. It was later widely
published, e.g.,Miklós Óvári, “Mi a nacionalizmus és hogyan harcoljunk ellene?” ½What is
nationalism and how shouldwe ﬁght against it?, If júKommunista 3 ðMarch 1961Þ: 24–29.
44 József Révai, 48 útján [Following 1848] ðBudapest, 1948Þ; Mevius, Agents of Mos-
cow, 111–262; Péter Apor, Fabricating Authenticity in Soviet Hungary: The Afterlife of the
First Hungarian Soviet Republic in the Age of State Socialism ðLondon, 2014Þ, 34–38.
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commonly asserted that Hungarians instinctively understood contemporary
movements of revolutionary national liberation, as they could recognize these
experiences in their own country’s past. The idea of Hungary as an anti-
imperialist nation long predated the communist regime. The experience of the
suppression of the 1848–49 revolution by the Russians and Austrians convinced
many educated Hungarians of their colonial oppression; at the turn of the
twentieth century, parts of the elite viewed the Hapsburgs as a new manifestation
of the Turkish oppression of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; after World
War I, the nostalgic image of Austria-Hungary was often mixed with views of
Austria as the colonial power that had subjugated Hungary.45 After the Second
World War, the communist regime reshaped the tradition. This outlook was now
also to be understood as part of a universally applicableMarxist ideological frame-
work in which history proceeded through a series of stages divided up by rev-
olutionary moments; political and economic transformations that Hungary had
undergone were now being replicated outside Europe. Moreover, making these
comparisons could render the basics of Marxist historical teleology tangible and
compelling, especially to a younger generation. Indeed, it was “youthful” Latin
American revolution that was most commonly wedded to previous Eastern Euro-
pean experiences in both elite journals and the youth press: the progressive struggle
for national independence in Cuba in the 1950s was anticipated by the revolution
of 1848 in Hungary; Che Guevara was a modern day reincarnation of Hungarian
romantic hero-martyr Sándor Petőﬁ; and the Pinochet coup in Chile was a repeat of
the imperialist intervention that had brought down Béla Kun and the First Hun-
garian Soviet Republic in 1919.46 It should be noted that these anti-imperialist
accounts usually ignored Hungary’s potentially problematic history as colonizer in
its own backyard, downplaying or omitting the imperialist aspirations of Austria-
Hungary in the Balkans and Hungarian governments’ ethnically based nation-
building programs of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.47
In the visual depiction of Third World oppression and struggle, visual styles
drawn from progressive national artistic traditions were often used. The illustra-
tions in the poetry collection Africa Awakes ð1961Þ, for example, drew on a style
45 See Tamás Scheibner, “Postcolonial Age, or Postcolonial Eastern and Central Eu-
rope?Critical Remarks from aHungarian Point ofView,”BalticWorlds 3, no. 2 ð2010Þ: 41.
46 On Sándor Petőﬁ as Che Guevara, see, e.g., Sándor Fekete, “Petőﬁ és a kommu-
nizmus” [Petőﬁ and communism], Valóság, no. 4 ð1974Þ: 95; on Hungary 1919 and Chile
1973, see, e.g., György Aczél, speech, Hungarian television, November 6, 1973, 16:30,
HU OSA 300-40-2, box 59.
47 Note that Croatians in the 1950s did connect their experience of Hungarian imperi-
alism in the last decades of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with the support for contempo-
rary African independence movements. See Dubravka Juraga, “Miroslav Krleza’s “Zas-
tave”: Socialism, Yugoslavia, and the Historical Novel,” in South Atlantic Review 62, no. 4
ð1997Þ: 47.
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of woodcut that had been repopularized in the post-1956 period to celebrate the
medieval and early modern peasant precursors of the modern socialist state.48 The
woodcuts, which depicted the jailing and lynching of black Africans, the suffer-
ings of forced labor, and the defenselessness of its rural population, evoked the
famous series on the 1514 Hungarian peasant uprising and its leader György
Dózsa created by leftist graphic artist Gyula Derkovits in 1928. His work—which
presented the eternal oppression of toilers and represented a powerful radical
leftist criticism of the interwar system—was widely popularized following 1956,
when the restored communist government sought to connect the suppression of
this medieval peasant uprising to the attempt to overthrow communist power in
1956, in order to construct a longer-term history of so-called counterrevolutions
against the Hungarian people. Translating the style and form of Derkovits’s
Dózsa to the colonial plantation, these depictions illustrated the contemporary
experience of Africans in a language that made their oppression and struggle
more easily comprehensible for those Hungarians familiar with the visual culture
of their own progressive national tradition.
Moreover, the recent national experience of “counterrevolution” in 1956 rein-
forced this historical link. Various ofﬁcially supported texts argued that this event
had further developed Hungarians’ instinctive sympathies with those battling
imperialism elsewhere and, moreover, had equipped them with new knowledge
about counterrevolutionary tactics that could be shared with those abroad. The
revolt itself was presented as the last in a series of attempts by domestic
reactionaries in league with external imperialist forces, running back through the
suppression of the peasant revolts, the democratic aspirations of the1848 revolu-
tions, and the First Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, to thwart the progressive
instincts of the Hungarian people.49 The White Books—the ofﬁcial text that was
used to disseminate this conception of “counterrevolution” in schools—drew direct
equivalences between Hungary’s experience of reactionary forces and the vio-
lence meted out to those trying to escape empires outside Europe. These texts
encouraged Hungarians to regard themselves as victims of a transnational reac-
tionary movement that had its roots in interwar fascism and was still trying to
undermine progressive movements whether in the Socialist Bloc or the decolo-
nizing world. Just as Hungarians had experienced Western imperialists’ support
for arms smuggling to rebels across the country’s western borders in October
1956, so former Nazi ofﬁcers were sent by France and the United States to
48 György Belia, ed., Ébredő Afrika: Néger költők antológiája [Africa awakes: An
anthology of black poets] ðBudapest, 1961Þ.
49 See, e.g., the historical novel written to popularize this interpretation: András Berkesi
and György Kardos, Kopjások ½Pikemen ðBudapest, 1959Þ. It was made into a ﬁlm in
1975. See also András Mink, “The Revisions of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution,” in Past
in the Making: Historical Revisionism in Central Europe after 1989, ed. Michal Kopeček
ðBudapest, 2008Þ, 169–78.
Decolonization and Internationalism in Socialist Hungary 865
This content downloaded from 23.235.32.0 on Thu, 17 Dec 2015 06:20:30 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Southeast Asia and Algeria to suppress new progressive movements for indepen-
dence, the White Books claimed.50
The experience of the 1956 revolt was also presented as a source of instruction
for other socialist movements facing threats from reactionary political forces.
Imre Patkó and Miklós Rév would become some of the best-known promoters of
Vietnamese culture in Hungary and across the Eastern Bloc in the 1960s.51 In one
early account they highlighted the common “counterrevolutionarymenace” faced
by the Hungarian and Vietnamese Communist parties in the fall of 1956. “Viet-
namese patriots” who had been ﬁghting together against their French colonizers
were faced by challenges to the leading role of the party and seemed set to break
apart into different political factions. The authors presented local reactions to the
Hungarian counterrevolution as a central ideological dividing line: “true Com-
munists” in Vietnam supported Soviet intervention and Kádár’s restoration of
communist power in Hungary, while “revisionists” hesitated. In this account, it
was the eventual realization of the horrors of “Hungary’s 1956”—the experience
of bloody imperialist counterrevolution against national independence and revo-
lution—that gave the Vietnamese the impetus they needed to resolve their
quarrels and close ranks against foreign imperialists.52
In connecting the decolonizing present to a domestic tradition of combating
imperialists and reactionaries, party intellectuals were concerned tomake socialist
patriotism relevant to a new generation. Hungarians’ own historical revolutionary
achievements were now closely connected to the vital new political movements
springing up across the world. However, in framing the connection in this way,
they were also attempting to downplay the relevance to the Eastern European
present of the struggles surrounding decolonization. Certainly, connections might
be made between continuing attacks on socialism in Eastern Europe and in the
decolonizing world in order to reinforce the idea of an ongoing global imperialist
threat that only uniﬁed communist parties could protect against. However, the
potentially inspiring stories of violent struggle for national liberation in the Third
World were seen as irrelevant as models for behavior in contemporary Hungary,
where the communist movement had overcome its enemies, established a stable
regime, and begun to pursue a modernizing and increasingly technocratic “con-
solidated socialism.”Yet the idea that the contemporary ﬁghts of the decolonizing
50 Nagy Imre és bűntársai ellenforradalmi összeesküvése ½The counterrevolutionary
conspiracy of Imre Nagy and his fellow criminals ðBudapest, 1958Þ. See especially
chap. 8, which compared the “counterrevolutionary terror” of 1956 both to 1919 in
Hungary and to contemporary imperialist atrocities in Cyprus, Malaya, and Algeria. It
also criticized the Western press’s focus on the “excessive force” that was used in the
suppression of the 1956 uprising, given the far greater violence used in Algeria.
51 See, e.g., Imre Patkó and Miklós Rév, Vietnam művészete ½The art of Vietnam
ðBudapest, 1967Þ. It was later translated into French, German, and Polish ðas Sztuka
WietnamuÞ.
52 Imre Patkó and Miklós Rév, Vietnam ðBudapest, 1960Þ, 146.
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world could ﬁnd true equivalences only in an Eastern European past became
contested. An early salvo in this challenge was ﬁred off by Sándor Csoóri,
mentioned above. In one sense, his accounts of visiting Cuba in 1961 appeared
to conform to ofﬁcial conceptions of historical development: he placed the
Caribbean’s present in the Hungarian past. Scenarios and struggles that he had
absorbed from progressive national histories made his ﬁrsthand experience of
the Cuban revolution appear familiar:
Fidel Castro and Che Guevara were inmy eyes the relatives of the young revolutionaries of
1848. The 20th century relatives of Petőﬁ, Vasvári, Lenkey. I met twice with Che, once in
our hotel another time during the march on José Martí square. It was like being in a Jókai
novel ½nineteenth-century Hungarian romantic nationalist novelist in which I was the main
character. Of course we didn’t have the faintest idea that the Soviet Union would entrench
itself politically in this once “liberated island.” . . . So I saw Cuba when it was a free,
independent country, ruled by courageous young people . . . who cared about the poor.53
Yet for Csoóri, these struggles also spoke to the domestic present. Like other
Hungarians, he noted the relevance of movements for national independence
outside Europe in relation to Soviet imperialism closer to home. From this per-
spective, Csoóri’s response, while contributing to the growth of a more intensely
internationalist mass culture, was subversive too. Cuba’s contemporary struggles
against theUnited States echoed not onlyHungary’sﬁghts for independence in the
nineteenth century but also, by implication, contemporary efforts to throw off
Soviet dominance in the twentieth.54 In 1961, the security services reported that
the then twenty-nine-year-old József Antall, who would later become the ﬁrst
postcommunist prime minister as leader of the center-right Hungarian Demo-
cratic Forum, cultivated sympathies for Fidel Castro. Antall was at this time a
member of anticommunist middle-class agrarian intellectual networks. For him,
Cuba was inspirational as a small country ﬁghting for independence against a
great power, an idea that resonated with the anti-Soviet sentiments of the 1956er
groups to which he belonged.55
53 Sándor Csoóri, “Közel a szülőföldhöz” [Close to the homeland], Kortárs, no. 4
ð2004Þ.
54 In the 1960s Csoóri was critical of the Soviet “occupation” of 1945 and attempted to
bring Red Army atrocities to public attention: Feljegyzés a “Tiszta Szívvel” című folyóirat
vitájáról [Notice on the debate of the journal “Tiszta Szívvel”], Budapest, March 6, 1965,
Gál Lajos KISZ KB Egyetemi és Főiskolai Osztály, PSL 289. f. 13/1965/53.őe. He
was one of the few to criticize publicly the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in
August 1968.
55 The security report is in Állambiztonsági Szolgálatok Történeti Levéltára ðHistorical
Archives of the Hungarian State Security, hereafter cited as ÁBTLÞTH O-11386, “Kátai,”
May 8, 1961, 193. See also János M. Rainer, “Egy ‘kompromisszum’ hétköznapjai–
jelenetek a hatvanas évekből: Antall József és az állambiztonság embere,” inMúlt századi
hétköznapok: Tanulmányok a Kádár-rendszer, ed. János M. Rainer ðBudapest, 2003Þ,
270–98.
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C. Regulating the Image of the West
The post-1956 political elite had come of age during the antifascist struggle of
the 1930s and the Second World War: the constant ﬁght against reaction was
central to their understanding of how a socialist system was established and
maintained. In the postwar period, they came to understand Western capitalism
as an outgrowth of fascism: from this perspective, the defense of socialist systems
was still reliant on constant vigilance in the face of “reactionary capitalist impe-
rialism.”56 Yet the changes in Hungary in the 1960s were leading youth to believe
that distinctions between socialism and capitalism were lessening. Socialist lead-
ers were concerned that their own support for peaceful coexistence between the
capitalist and communist worlds since 1956 had led the youth to seek out sim-
ilarities between these systems and to value the humanization of capitalist coun-
tries. Elites expressed fear that the class struggle in theWest was not understood;57
they also believed that the civil rights movement—supported by President Ken-
nedy—had led to an unquestioning idealization of the United States as capable of
peace and equality.58 Young people “born into socialism” appeared particularly
liable to entertain the illusions about capitalism contained in bourgeois propa-
ganda because they had no ﬁrsthand experience of it.59 The idea that socialism
necessitated the constant struggle against “fascistic”Western capitalism no longer
seemed powerful. As a Communist Youth political instructor in the capital
complained in 1962, “the old comrades participating in political instruction had
experienced the privation of capitalism and the horrors of fascism. The previous
regime left its imprint much more deeply on them than on the young, who were
only children in those years.”60
In the context of this anxiety, the struggles of newly decolonized and indepen-
dent states of the extra-European world provided stories through which the
supposedly immutable differences between these ideological systems could be
reafﬁrmed. Whereas peaceful coexistence and growing economic cooperation in
Europe were considered to have hidden the realities of the differences between
capitalism and socialism close to home, the ThirdWorld exposed the real distinc-
tions between the systems that an older generation knew from its own experience
56 István Rév, Retroactive Justice: A Prehistory of Post-communism ðStanford, CA,
2005Þ, chap. 6.
57 See, e.g., the report on a youth survey of 125 seventeen- and eighteen-year-olds in
Vilmos Faragó, “A Small Country,” Élet és Irodalom, January 7, 1967.
58 “Jelentés a diákifjúság eszmei-politikai, világnézeti és erkölcsi arculatával kapcso-
latos néhány problémáról” [Report concerning a few problems of the political-ideological
and moral attitudes of youth], PSL 289. f. 13/1963/33.őe.
59 György Aczél’s report concerning the youth politics of the HSWP, Central Commit-
tee meeting, February 18–19, 1970 (MNLOL 288/4/104–5, 42).
60 Ervin Várkonyi, “Forradalmi romantika a KISZ politikai körben” [Revolutionary
romanticism in the Communist Youth political clubs], If jú Kommunista ðDecember 1962Þ.
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but the young had yet to learn. TheHungarianmedia and party activists frequently
drew attention to the excessive violence of Western powers in collapsing em-
pires in order to undermine the capitalist world’s claim to represent civilization.
This reached its apogee during the “We are with you, Vietnam” solidarity cam-
paign ð1965–75Þ. Witnesses to atrocities—including My Lai—were brought to
Hungary as delegations to testify to American inhumanity,61 and the Russell
Tribunal, which saw itself as a Nuremberg Trial for Vietnam, was widely reported
on.62
Given the generational understanding of this crisis—that a collective memory
of the inherent violence of capitalism had not been sufﬁciently transmitted to the
youth—it is not surprising that the elite’s response was to construct historical
arguments that presented Vietnam as a revival of Nazi barbarism in Southeast
Asia.63 Volumes of photo books were published that linked the atrocities com-
mitted against Vietnamese civilians to the Nazi destruction of Oradour and Lidice,
alongside French colonial atrocities of the late 1950s. The ofﬁcial propaganda
section of the party planned a series of White Books detailing violence against
Vietnamese villages, imitating the volumes that had been used to publicize the
cruelties of the so-called counterrevolutionaries in Hungary in 1956.64 According
to ofﬁcial interpretations, America had once again proved its unworthiness to
represent civilization, and the Eastern Bloc was shown to be its true bearer.
Strikingly, writers in these debates did often allude to the use of violence during
the Stalinist period as contrary to the values of the modern world as well;
nevertheless, these instances were presented as short-term aberrations that did
not fundamentally call into question socialism’s superior claims to represent
civilization. They were much quicker to draw direct links between their struggle
against Nazism in Europe and the present-day technological, medical, and eco-
nomic aid they provided to the North Vietnamese in order to assert a longer-term
commitment of socialism to the defense of humanity.65
Multiple surveys were conducted in the mid-1960s to assess young Hungar-
ians’ worldviews—a phenomenon that in itself tells us much about the impor-
tance of internationalist commitments for socialist citizenship in that decade.
These surveys discovered that this negative image of the United States had been
61 “Vietnam Massacre Eyewitnesses Begin Visit,” Hungarian TV, January 12, 1970
(Daily report, Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], FRB-70-008). See also
atrocity literature such as Miklós Zalka, A dzsungel vére ðBudapest, 1971Þ; Madeleine
Riffaud, Vietnam lángokban, trans. József Román ðBudapest, 1966Þ.
62 Népszabadság, November 26, 1967.
63 See, e.g., “Public Shocked by US Cruelties in Vietnam,” Hungarian television,
April 10, 1969 (Daily report, FBIS-FRB-69-070).
64 See “Youth Delegation Returns from Cyprus Meeting,” Hungarian television, Jan-
uary 27, 1966 (Daily report, FBIS-FRB-66-020).
65 György Máté, Vietnam: Szemünk láttára ðBudapest, 1973Þ.
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effectively reasserted: it was seen as a threat to the socialist world and to Hungary
by a majority of the youth surveyed. Nevertheless, they also discovered that
such a feeling was seldom accompanied by a “pro-Soviet mentality.”66
II. The Dangers of Anti-imperialism
In early 1965, the largest solidarity movement of the entire communist period was
established following the intensiﬁcation of the US bombing of Vietnam. This
marked the ﬁrst time that the party and state ofﬁcials had initiated a nationwide
coordinated effort that involved a multitude of social organizations and that went
beyond the youth or educational sphere to organize in the workplace. It thus
penetrated the everyday lives of a much greater number of citizens than previous
calls for solidarity had done. Clues to the roots of this new movement can be
found in debates among various authorities over methods to control young
people’s heterodox understandings of anti-imperialism. In the years prior to the
movement’s establishment, ideas of transnational solidarity and the perspectives
drawn from the global revolutionary struggle started to mobilize political and
cultural visions among the youth, especially those who took seriously the idea of
the creation a new type of socialist society. Exposure to new socialist experiments
outside Europe provided activists with the ideological raw materials with which
to think through their political visions. It gave them access to a range of leftist
positions that were unavailable at home, where political divisions were, for the
most part, kept hidden. By the mid-1960s, the political imaginations of activist
youth had been quite effectively internationalized: they viewed their own domes-
tic progressive traditions and new revolutions across the world as closely inter-
twined, capable of informing each other in ways that often challenged the party
leadership’s attempts to control the terms of communication between these
worlds. The period 1964–73 would be marked by repeated challenges to ofﬁcial
interpretations and regular debate within elite groups over the extent to which
these activities should be tolerated and the ways in which the inappropriate
responses that international struggles inspired should be dealt with. In the case
of Vietnam, various authorities felt threatened by the excessively leftist radicalism
and the nationalist sentiment the conﬂict could inspire.
By 1964, the party leadership, Communist Youth, university ofﬁcials, and
the police were becoming increasingly worried that Maoist China was inspir-
ing inappropriately revolutionary zeal within some quarters of elite Hungarian
66 See Faragó, “A Small Country.” Communist Youth reports often assessed youth
sentiments with regard to international affairs. See the Communist Youth Executive
Committee Report of 1967 ðPIL 289/3/210Þ, which asserted that while youth were ﬁrmly
behind Vietnam solidarity, they were nevertheless too easily inﬂuenced by “bourgeois
propaganda” concerning Western societies.
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youth.67 Security organs were concerned with the propaganda drives, organized
mainly from the Chinese embassy in Budapest, that targeted both Hungarian and
foreign students.68 Indeed, this is the period when “mood reports” focusing on the
inﬂuence of foreign policy on youth started to be regularly produced by the
Communist Youth League, possibly in response to this perceived threat. Chinese
critiques were of particular concern because they linked the alleged limitations of
Eastern Bloc socialism at home—the abandonment of true revolution and the rise
of consumerism, materialism, and bureaucratization—to its failings abroad,
notably its inability to express real, meaningful solidarity with a true revolution-
ary struggle being waged by the north Vietnamese. This position provided
ideological ballast to radical youth: students at elite universities in Budapest, for
instance, formed a Marxist-Leninist party devoted to rediscovering a more
authentic Marxism. One of its most prominent members, György Pór, remem-
bered in an oral history interview how Chinese criticism of the Soviets—
which was widely reported in the national and university press in 1964—played
an important role in the development of his group’s critique of Hungarian
socialism’s conservative turn.69 Subsequently, Pór himself sought personal
contacts with Chinese students in Budapest as well as with the Chinese embassy,
67 A year after the Sino-Soviet split, in December 1961, János Kádár criticized the
Chinese rejection of peaceful coexistence, suggesting that the true interests of workers were
wages, paid holidays, and social security and that socialist states had a responsibility to
protect them from the “fatal consequences of war,” which was “a thousand times more
important.” He continued: “Some people . . . confuse . . . civil war, the liberation struggle
against colonizers and imperialist war. . . .Wecommunists have always shown full solidarity
with workers waging a revolutionary struggle against capitalist slavery, and with the
oppressed peoples ﬁghting for liberation from the colonial yoke, but we have always fought
andwill ﬁght to avert imperialist, aggressive wars. . . .Achange in the social system depends
entirely on the will of the people of the country concerned”; speech reported in Pravda,
December 26, 1961.
68 Security services were particularly concerned about the inﬁltration of the Chinese
into the African student body in Budapest: on January 17, 1966, for instance, they reported
that during a commemoration of the death of Patrice Lumumba, Congolese students were
shown a Chinese propaganda ﬁlm; “FeljegyzésMéhes elvtárs részére a kongói diákok által
szervezett megemlékezésről a Zsomolya úti kollégiumban Budapest” [Notice to Comrade
Méhes concerning the commemoration organized by Congolese students in the Zsomolya
Street dormitory], January 1966, KISZKBNemzetközi Kapcsolatok Osztálya, PSL 289. f.
13/1966/23.őe.
69 György Pór, interview conducted by JamesMark, Brussels, March 13, 2009; for this
position, see also interviews with Gábor Révai, conducted by Péter Apor, October 8, 2008;
with Tamás Bauer, conducted by Péter Apor, Budapest, March 5, 2009; and with György
Dalos, conducted by Péter Apor, Budapest, April 17, 2009. The differences between the
Chinese and Soviet positions were widely reported and discussed, even in the youth and
university press; see, e.g., László Barnabás, “A kinai kérdés,” Közgazdász: A Marx Károly
Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem lapja, April 25, 1964, 1.
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where he became a regular visitor and recipient of propaganda materials.70 Over
the course of 1964, the party leadership supervising the ofﬁcial youth organiza-
tions expressed increasing concern that the Communist Youth League was not
working hard enough to head off the inﬂuence of the Chinese, create their own
linkages with youth organizations in Southeast Asia, or make the values of
ofﬁcial solidarity meaningful to a broader population.71
By early 1965, the central party leadership, along with leaders of party branches
at universities and in districts of Budapest, was also concerned that American
bombings in Vietnam were inspiring activism that was excessively nationalist
and insufﬁciently directed by the ofﬁcial Communist Youth organs. OnMarch 15,
1965, the ﬁrst major demonstrations for solidarity with the struggle of the Viet-
namese people were organized. Reports suggest that these started out as a call for
solidarity meetings from the Communist Youth League, but enthusiastic young-
sters went beyond what was ofﬁcially prescribed and began to demonstrate pub-
licly, even across provincial Hungary: hundreds of people protested in Szabolcs
and Hajdú-Bihar counties, for instance, while around ﬁve hundred youths dem-
onstrated in the northeastern town of Nyíregyháza and sent a protest letter to the
US embassy. Events linking the annual March 15 commemoration of the pro-
gressive struggle of the 1848 revolutions with protests against the war in Viet-
nam took place at Debrecen’s Kossuth University, Medical School, and Agricul-
tural Training College.72 Local Communist Youth organizations were troubled by
them, noting that they were often started by foreign students, who were perceived
as a disruptive inﬂuence.73 Reports also expressed anxiety that these events might
70 ÁBTL V-154.419/1 21, 26, 77; ÁBTL V-154.419/2, 45. See also trial material,
ÁBTL, 3.1.9. V-154419/8, Bf. V. 566/1968: “Statement concerning the Criminal Activities
of the Accused,” 11.
71 ½Unknown author, probably ﬁrst half of 1964, “Feljegyzés a KISZ külügyi kapcso-
latainak és a KISZ KB Külügyi Osztálya munkájának egyes kérdéseiről” ½Notice con-
cerning a few questions of the foreign relations of KISZ and of the work of the Foreign
Relations Department of KISZ Central Committee, PSL 289. f. 13/1964/27.őe.
72 “Információ az Észak-Vietnamot ért amerikai dél-vietnami agresszió elleni tiltakozás
megnyilvánulásairól az ifjúság között ða megyebizottságok tájékozatása alapjánÞ” [Infor-
mation concerning the manifestation of protest among youth against the US–South
Vietnam aggression against North Vietnam (based on the reports of county committees)],
Communist Youth Agitprop Department, Budapest, March 17, 1965, PSL 289. f. 13/1965/
23.őe.
73 Communist Youth mood reports often reported that foreign students were less likely
to toe the ideological line, praising Chinese help in Vietnam or criticizing the Eastern
Bloc’s commitment to peaceful coexistence in an era of anti-imperialist struggle. This was
particularly troubling as the Communist Youth League often sent foreign students to the
countryside—in their hundreds—to spread the message about internationalist solidarity:
“Tájékoztató a Gyarmati If júság Napjának megünnepléséről” [Information concerning the
celebration of the Day of Colonial Youth], Budapest, August 29, 1966, KISZKBAgitprop,
Osztály, PSL 289. f. 8/857.őe.
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seem to echo the public demonstrations in front of the American embassy in
Moscow that the Soviet police had deemed excessively provocative and clamped
down on.74 Linking Vietnam with the March 15 anniversary of the 1848 freedom
ﬁght was potentially threatening as well: it connected anger at contemporary US
foreign policy with the historical struggle for Hungarian independence against
Austria and Russia and hence could imply criticism of a revived eastern domina-
tion of Hungary.75
In the months that followed, the Communist Youth League began to plan an
ofﬁcial solidarity program that could capture the demonstrable anti-imperialist
energies of youth but would also channel them into the more ideologically
acceptable form of the state-sponsored rally ðﬁg. 2Þ. Other unauthorized demon-
strations were soon shut down. Radical acts of solidarity were rejected: offers by
industrial workers and students to go out to Vietnam to ﬁght were refused.76 Party
ofﬁcials and the media often reminded the younger generation of their obligations
to demonstrate only a tempered solidarity, fearing that an excessive anti-
Americanism would make it difﬁcult to obtainWestern technology.77 Communist
Youth leaders called on their members not to view the conﬂict in terms of radical
politics, irreconcilable differences, or necessary escalation and were clearly
concerned by the widespread perception that the Soviets and Hungarians were
withholding proper military support and prolonging the war.78 A commitment to a
responsible and distanced solidarity in everyday professional settings was widely
74 Ibid. The reports do not mention the nationalities of these foreign students; in other
sources, the role of African students is highlighted.
75 “Információ az Észak-Vietnamot ért amerikai dél-vietnami agresszió elleni tiltakozás
megnyilvánulásairól az if júság között ða megyebizottságok tájékozatása alapjánÞ,” Buda-
pest, March 17, 1965, Communist Youth Agitprop Department, PSL 289. f. 13/1965/23.őe.
76 Interview with Révai. One youth journal reported that hundreds had volunteered
to go to Vietnam, claiming that this proved that KISZ was mobilizing effectively: If jú
Kommunista ðJanuary 1967Þ: 9. Potential volunteers were encouraged by government
statements claiming that volunteers would be sent if North Vietnam requested them. See,
e.g., “Government Statement on US War in Vietnam,” Hungarian television, May 13,
1965 (Daily report, FBIS-FRB-65-093).
77 See László Borhi, “A nemzeti külpolitika határai: Az Egyesült Államok és Mag-
yarország 1941–1989,” in Európa, nemzet, külpolitika: Tanulmányok Ádám Magda 85.
születésnapjára, ed. László Borhi and Ádám Magda ðBudapest, 2010Þ, 38. On economic
necessity and softening policy toward the United States, see Tibor Glant, “Ninety Years of
United States-Hungarian Relations,” Eger Journal of American Studies 13 ð2012Þ: 175;
M. Gasiorowski and S. W. Polachek, “Conﬂict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and
Linkages in the Era of Détente,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, no. 4 ð1982Þ: 713.
78 For these fears, see Communist Youth League mood reports, for example, Hangu-
latjelentés, Budapest, November 20, 1965, Communist Youth Agitprop Department, PSL
289. f. 13/1965/23.őe. On redirecting youth events away from radical anti-imperialism:
“Javaslat a Titkárságnak az egyetemi KISZ-titkárok 1965/66-os tanévi országos tovább-
képzésének programjára, é.n. KISZ KB Egyetemi és Főiskolai Osztálya” [Proposal to the
Secretariat concerning the program of the national training session for university KISZ
secretaries in the academic year 1965–66], PSL 289. f. 13/1965/53.
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encouraged by solidarity organs. Simply by working in a factory in Budapest
one could be contributing to the anti-imperial struggle: this idea was made most
explicit in so-called solidarity shifts, during which workers would put in extra
hours and “voluntarily” donate their extra wages to the Vietnamese people.79
Nevertheless, these ofﬁcial movements provided space in which alternative
forms of transnational identiﬁcation developed. For instance, groups of radical
students at elite Budapest universities such as Eötvös Loránd University and the
Karl Marx University of Economics began to establish semiofﬁcial Vietnamese
solidarity groups within the ofﬁcial movement to express what they considered
authentic solidarity. They organized unofﬁcial Vietnamese Sundays during which
students carried out construction work to earn money that would be donated
through the Chinese embassy to support the struggle.80 They took their inspiration
fromMoscow students who in 1961, following the landings of Cuban exiles at the
Bay of Pigs to overthrow Castro’s regime, had raised funds to buy the Cubans
tractors and other machinery.81 Others organized unofﬁcial demonstrations that
took place outside the American embassy on July 20, 1966, and in front of the
American pavilion at the Budapest international fair in the same year. Here
leaﬂets were distributed, slogans announcing “Hands Off Vietnam” were dis-
played, and images of President Johnson were daubed with paint.82
Anti-imperialist ideology also opened up new links with theWest.With the rise
in the mid-1960s of Western student movements protesting against their own
systems’ imperialism abroad and democratic deﬁcits at home, the image of the
West in Hungary shifted. While the works of New Left thinkers who argued for
the collapse of distinctions between capitalism and socialism were usually placed
on so-called closed circuit reading lists that only party elites could access,83
Western cultural products that had an anti-imperialist outlook were encouraged.
This policy reached its high point during the Vietnam War between 1965 and
79 On the signiﬁcance of solidarity shifts, see, e.g., “Összefoglaló az 1965. évi ‘Akció-
program’ eszmei-politikai, nevelési célkitűzéseinek megvalósításáról, a KISZ 1966. évi
politikai munkájáról” [Summary of the realization of the political-ideological and educa-
tion goals of the ‘Action program’ and the political work of KISZ in 1966], PSL 289. f. 13/
1966/14.őe. Their importance was emphasized by László Pataki, secretary to the central
committee of KISZ, to delegates at the “We Accuse Imperialism” seminar in Budapest,
April 19, 1966.
80 ÁBTLV-154.419/1, 258.
81 “Vietnámi vasárnapok” ½Vietnamese Sundays,Egyetemi Lapok, January 13, 1966, 4.
82 Ferenc Erős, interview conducted by Péter Apor, Budapest, October 9, 2008.
83 Western New Left texts, such as Ernst Fischer’s Art and Co-existence, Herbert
Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man, Daniel Cohn-Bendit’s Left-Wing Radicalism and the
Italian New Left’s Il Manifesto, were placed on so-called closed circuit lists and were
meant to be available only to party elites; Gábor Murányi, “A ‘zárt’ osztály: Könyvek
kiválasztottaknak,” in his A múlt szövedéke: Históriák a megbicsaklott 20. századból
(Budapest, 2004), 261.
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1968, when Western anti-imperialist mass culture was widely reported on.84
Readings of antiwar poetry by Western authors were organized by the Commu-
nist Youth League.85 Even the lyrics of Bob Dylan were published with guides
that translated their complex symbolism into Marxist or anti-imperialist terms.86
These ideological imports had a dual function. On the one hand, they effectively
reinforced the idea of a corrupt imperialist West, as convincingly attested to by
those closest to the system. On the other, they expressed the hope that members
of a new generation in the West who appreciated their system’s own failings
might eventually dismantle capitalism from within and bring their countries closer
to the values of the Eastern Bloc.87
Ofﬁcial institutions attempted to create links with Vietnam protest movements
in Western countries, but only insofar as these could be harnessed to the state’s
own ends. The National Council of Hungarian Youth was instructed to develop
links withWestern organizations: some Budapest groups linked upwith solidarity
committees in Wisconsin, for example.88 The Hungarian Communist Youth
League presented socialist civilization as committed to peace and humanity in a
manner that imperialist and capitalist countries could not claim and asserted its
moral right to shape a transnational solidarity. In April 1966, the National Com-
mittee of Hungarian Student Organizations held the conference “We Accuse
Imperialism!,” which brought together students from ﬁfty-four countries, includ-
ingWestern Europe, to discussVietnam. InNovember 1972, theHungarianAcad-
emy of Sciences and Hungarian Scientiﬁc Peace Council organized an interna-
tional conference on US war crimes that sought to remind the world about the
Eastern Bloc’s commitment to peace and the further militarization and barbari-
zation of America that involvement in Vietnam had brought about.89 However,
this was a very strictly controlled opening that was only encouraged as part of an
ofﬁcial institutionalized exchange. Individualistic anti-imperialists in the West,
such as Rudi Dutschke, were often criticized for their supposed anarchism, their
privileging of revolutionary play over serious content, and their refusal to accept
86 “Vietnikek–gitárral” ½Vietnamistas–with guitars, Világ Ifjúsága, no. 3 ðMarch
1966Þ.
87 This argument can be found commonly in KISZ reports; see, e.g., KISZ report on
Western movements ðNovember 1968Þ, 46–47, PSL 289/3/252.
88 “A szolidáritásért” ½For Solidarity, Közgazdász: A Marx Károly Közgazdaságtudo-
mányi lapja, March 26, 1966.
89 The conference followed the publication of the report of the Commision of Enquiry
for war crimes in Indochina inOctober of that year. The proceedings were published asDes
Savants sur le Vietnam ðBudapest, 1972Þ.
85 “Merre van Vietnám?” ½Whither Vietnam?, If jú Kommunista, no. 4 ð1968Þ.
84 See, e.g., “Diákmozgalmak a fejlett tőkésországokban” ½Student movements in
developed capitalist countries, If jú Kommunista ðJuly 1968Þ; “Az ifjúsági mozgalmak
fellendülése a tőkésországokban” ½The rise of student movements in capitalist countries,
If jú Kommunista ðOctober 1968Þ.
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the leadership of their own national Communist parties.90 Hence the government
and its police organs were suspicious when their own citizens attempted to make
connections with anti-imperialist forces in the West, and many activists reported
difﬁculties in establishing contacts across the Iron Curtain.91 Nevertheless, Gábor
Révai—a one-time Maoist who had written to the central party leadership
volunteering to ﬁght with the north Vietnamese—corresponded with Rudi
Dutschke between 1966 and 1971 about effective ways of aiding the struggle of
the Vietnamese people.92 “The friendship with Dutschke,” explained Révai in
2008, “meant that in a country beyond the Iron Curtain . . . we knew that
revolutionaries with the mission to save the world thought in the same terms as
we did.”93
Internationalism and solidarity with the Third World that at the beginning of
the decade had been seen as a cure for the ideological ills of Hungarian youth now
appeared to elites to have become a problem in itself. In the late 1960s, party
leaders professed themselves concerned with the growing fascination for “revo-
lutionary romanticism” stoked by the struggle in Vietnam, the expansion of guer-
rilla warfare in Latin America, and increasing Western radicalism. This, they
argued, had led to growing disinterest in the process of “peaceful construction”
ðbékés építőmunkaÞ at home—a fear articulated at the plenum of the Central
Committee on several occasions.94 Against this background, the party leadership
and its ideological-propaganda apparatus sought to reassert the primacy of re-
sponsible revolutionary models drawn from the national past.95 From 1965, a
week-long program of revolutionary youth days—a new set of holidays for
young people celebrating a socialist patriotism set free from internationalist
connections—took place every March.96 These celebrations presented earlier
instances of domestic leftist radical activism in 1919 and 1945 as precursors of
91 Miklós Haraszti, interview conducted by Péter Apor, Vienna, April 10, 2009.
92 Interview with Révai; for the correspondence, see http://www.eurozine.com/articles
/2009-04-23-dutschke-de.html; “Dutschke magyar barátja: Beszélgetés Révai Gáborral”
½Dutschke’s Hungarian friend: A Conversation with Gábor Révai, 2000 20 ðJuly–August
2008Þ: 36–43.
93 “Dutschke magyar barátja,” 39; “Dutschke’s letter to Révai 16 June 1966,” 2000 20
ðJuly–August 2008Þ: 44.
94 The most sophisticated ðand resoluteÞ critic of both ultraleftist and right-wing
moderate attitudes among youth was the leading cultural ideologue of the Kádár era, ðthen
Deputy-Minister of Culture and Secretary of the Central CommitteeÞ György Aczél. See
his Eszmék erejével ½With the force of ideas ðBudapest, 1971Þ, 315–18.
95 For an example of this emphasis on the homeland and its revolutionary traditions, see
its promotion in 1967 in the Young Communist magazine: “Forradalmi If júsági Napok”
½Revolutionary youth days, If jú Kommunista ðJanuary 1967Þ.
96 PSL 289/4/250; see also the discussion in Apor, Fabricating Authenticity, epilogue.
For more on this newMarch “spring festival,” see György Gyarmati,Március hatalma—a
hatalom márciusa: Fejezetek március 15. ünneplésének történetéből ðBudapest, 1998Þ,
166–67.
90 See, e.g.,“Rudi Dutschke és a nyugatnémet ‘nyugtalan ifjúság’” ½Rudi Dutschke and
the western German “restless youth”, Kritika ðJune 1968Þ.
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the student and New Left movements that were emerging in the West—not in
order to create solidarity with those movements, but to demonstrate that
Hungarians had no need for radical ﬁghts in the 1960s since their forefathers
had already fought those battles some twenty to ﬁfty years previously.97 These
programs advocated the “revolution of the everyday,” a concept that acknowl-
edged the importance of revolution to youth globally but nevertheless sought to
direct young Hungarians away from the excessively confrontational or violent
activist sentiments found elsewhere in the world. According to Péter Rényi,
deputy editor of the party paper Népszabadság, the socialist state instead
needed “a thoroughly systematic, durable, long-term, patient, regular activism
in economics, in culture, and also in politics.”98 According to this approach,
youth should aspire to ﬁnd sufﬁcient satisfaction in the “peaceful revolutionary
heroism” they performed in the everyday work of socialist construction.
From 1968 onward, the party leadership as well as police authorities moved
aggressively against those who challenged ofﬁcial interpretations of anti-
imperialism, and semiautonomous and ideologically heterodox movements were
shut down. The best-known instance was the so-calledMaoist trial that took place
in the spring of 1968. A group of students were accused of organizing a Maoist-
inspired conspiracy and an illegal party to overthrow the regime, and despite the
absurdity of such charges, the leaders were jailed. While the trial received limited
publicity, the ofﬁcial press did report that a conspiracy had been revealed and
eliminated. Word spread that those convicted were intellectuals categorized as
Maoist, making it clear that domesticating Chinese or other excessive forms of
revolutionary behavior would not be tolerated any more.99
III. The Chilean Revival
By the late 1960s, it was clear that a state-sponsored policy of anti-imperialist
solidarity had exposed segments of Hungarian youth to radical alternatives that
they had been able to turn against the policies of their own state. This led ﬁgures
within the party leadership such as György Aczél ðcultural secretary of the
Central CommitteeÞ, Miklós Óvári ðsecretary of the Committee of Education of
97 It should also be noted that these new commemorative events were designed to
downplay the “excessively” nationalist message of the 1848 revolution and to emphasize
the pro-Soviet context of Béla Kun’s 1919 Republic of Councils and the Red Army’s
successful campaign against the Wehrmacht in Hungary in 1945.
98 Péter Rényi, “A forradalom, mely nem falja fel gyermekeit” ½The revolution which
does not devour her children, Valóság 13 ðSeptember 1970Þ: 19.
99 On the trial, see Gábor Murányi, “Tévelygők, avagy a ‘maoista összeesküvés,’” in
Beszélő évek: A Kádár-korszak története 1957–1968, ed. Sándor Révész ðBudapest,
2000Þ, 578–81. The press communiqué was in Népszabadság ðJune 9, 1968Þ. The
defendents rejected the label of Maoism, preferring to view themselves as “authentic
Marxist-Leninists.”
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the Central CommitteeÞ, and Béla Köpeczi ðhead of the cultural department of the
Central CommitteeÞ to question their domestication of the Third World at home
and to clamp down on some of the bottom-up activism that had sustained a
meaningful culture of solidarity. Nevertheless, these ofﬁcial and semiofﬁcial
cultures would be revived once again when the socialist Salvador Allende came
to power in Chile in 1970. This new type of socialist experiment—peaceful,
incremental, and seemingly compatible with multiparty democracy and the
capitalist world—appeared to answer some of the fundamental problems with
domesticating global revolution that had occupied elites over the previous decade.
Throughout the 1960s, the reception of Latin American revolution was double-
edged. On the one hand, Latin America probably had a greater impact as a source
of revolutionary inspiration than any other region of socialist transformation. This
was in part because—unlike Africa or Southeast Asia—it was imagined very
early on as a site of revolutionary exchange rather than an object for revolutionary
improvement: in the early 1960s, economic elites came to regard Latin America
as part of an intermediate region between the developed and developing worlds
whose status within the world economy bore similarities to Eastern Europe’s.
Thus it was not viewed simply as an area for assistance but also as a region with
which ideas and programs could be exchanged and shared.100 Hungarian econ-
omists started large research projects that focused on Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, and
Chile. Their interest was reciprocated by Latin American socialist planners, some
of whom took a strong interest in the Hungarian economic experiments with the
“socialist market.”101
On the other hand, some aspects of Latin American revolution could be
ideologically problematic. Although the Cuban revolution clearly played an
important role in the politicization of young activists at home, some of its
excesses seemed troubling. György Aczél, cultural impresario of the new elite
and deputy minister of culture ð1957–67Þ, ﬁrst visited Cuba in early 1962 and
remained one of the most active ofﬁcial voices on Latin American affairs
throughout the decade.102 He was sympathetic but also critical: in his ﬁrst report
of May 1962, he presented himself as unconvinced by the Cuban elite’s certainty
that revolution needed to be violently exported, suggesting that the Hungarian
100 See, e.g., Jenő Rédei, “Változások Latin-Amerikában” ½Changes in Latin America,
Társadalmi Szemle 25, no. 5 ð1970Þ: 79, for a discussion of economic reforms and the
increasing independence of Latin America from US imperialism. On the similarities
between Latin America and Eastern Europe in their historical development, see Ádám
Anderle, “Osztály, etnikum, nemzet Latin-Amerikában” [Class, ethnicity, nation in Latin
America], in A változó harmadik világ, ed. István Dobozi and László Láng ðBudapest,
1985Þ, 377–85.
101 András Inotai, “Latin American Studies in Hungary,” in Revista Europea de
Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe/European Review of Latin American and Carib-
bean Studies 72 ðApril 2002Þ: 115–21.
102 MNLOL 288/5/264, 288/5/270, and 288/5/278.
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model of post-1956 paciﬁcation and integration was of greater contemporary
relevance to the peaceful construction of socialism globally.103 As the decade
went on, Aczél was increasingly required to assert the inapplicability of Cuban
models of revolutionary heroism in contemporary Hungary, where these romantic
and heroic images appeared to have a hold on elite youth. He argued that the
foundations of socialism were already laid and thus that Hungary was in a
consolidated stage rather than in the ﬁrst ﬂush of heroic socialist construction.104
In this context, valiant and exaggerated deeds were no longer necessary, and
exemplars of heroism, militarism, or excessive revolutionary practice ðszuper-
forradalmiságÞ105 were criticized. Che Guevara in particular became a symbol of
irresponsible revolution. On March 17, 1970, György Aczél, by then minister of
culture, speaking at a Communist Youth central committee debate on youth
politics, declared that Che “was heroic ½and demonstrated that the impossible
was possible, but he could have been a bigger hero if he had devoted himself to
thirty years of small-scale everyday revolutionary work ðaprómunkaÞ.” Lenin
was then presented as the real hero of socialist construction for his commitment to
the slow, grinding work of building socialism.106
Latin America was a region whose developmental and political proximity to
Hungary had been established but whose revolutionary exemplars had hitherto
been problematic. Allende’s Chilean experiment from 1970 was thus a revelation:
103 MNLOL 288/5/264, 186–96.
104 In 1962, following the collectivization drives of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the
party proclaimed the ﬁrst stage of the political construction of socialism complete.
Hungary had now entered a phase of “consolidated socialism.”
105 This term is used in the state-supported account of Che’s life: Gábor Karczag,
Ernesto Che Guevara ðBudapest, 1969Þ, 58. Karczag presents Che as in full knowledge
that becoming a guerrilla was a renunciation of responsible socialist behavior. He relates
how Guevara told his mother in 1965 that he was about to cut sugar cane and direct an
industrial factory in Cuba when in fact he was heading for the Congo to ﬁght. His mother
replied that he should go to Algeria or Ghana to provide economic expertise; hence,
according to Karczag, Guevara fully understood what proper socialist behavior ought to be
ð133Þ. Karczag then presents Guevara’s death in Bolivia as being the inevitable result of
not following appropriate revolutionary methods. On the GDR’s attempts at controlling
Che’s image at home, see Hosek, Sun, Sex and Socialism, 146–51.
106 KISZ Central Committee debate on youth politics, March 17, 1970; Lajos Méhes’s
report 182-3, PSL 289/2/55. Franz Fanon’sWretched of the Earth ðA Föld rabjaiÞ—which
advocated revolutionary violence and rejected the role of the working class in anti-
imperialist movements, claiming the peasantry to be the real revolutionary class—was not
published until 1985. For early criticism of Fanon’s call for violence, see Tamás Szentes
and István Kende, Fejlődő országok nem-kapitalista útja ½Developing countries on the
noncapitalist path ðBudapest, 1966Þ, 190. These authors argued that Hungarians should
support the Algerian FLN because they rejected Fanon’s ultraradicalism and incorporated
the working class into the struggle. A short excerpt was published in 1976 as part of an
“anti-imperialism reader”: István Kende, ed., Fejlődő országok–haladó eszmék ½De-
veloping countries–progressive ideas ðBudapest, 1976Þ, 144–55.
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it provided a form of peaceful, incremental, and responsible revolution whose
values, if appropriately interpreted, could be seen to echo Hungary’s own.107
Chile was often discussed in elite party journals as the answer to the emergence
from the late 1950s in Latin America of supposedly “petit-bourgeois revolutions”
that were based on guerrilla warfare and ignored the “true interests” of workers.108
Moreover, it appeared for a brief moment to speak powerfully to some of the
central concerns of consolidated socialism in the early 1970s. First, Chile’s at-
tempts to reconcile revolution with multiparty democracy coincided with Hun-
gary’s brief experiment—from the late 1960s until the conservative backlash of
1973–74—with a limited democratization within social and political bodies, most
notably universities and the Communist Youth organizations. Although Hungar-
ian elites were never planning to give up their hold on state power, Allende’s
attempts to carry out socialist transformation in the context of a political coalition
nevertheless became a proxy through which to discuss the limits of future de-
mocratization for state socialist systems.
Hungarian elites were also fascinated by the Chilean revolution’s relationship
to the global political and economic system. With the adoption of the New
Economic Mechanism ðNEMÞ, the beginnings of a socialist market and a gradual
opening up of Hungary to Western ﬁnancial institutions in the late 1960s, elites
increasingly promoted a responsible or tempered confrontation with the capitalist
world.109 Although the West remained ofﬁcially an ideological enemy until the
end of the communist period, regime intellectuals increasingly encouraged the
idea that socialist and capitalist systems could integrate economically, and coexist
peacefully, while maintaining their distinct social and economic systems.110
Nevertheless, it was difﬁcult to communicate such a delicately balanced view of
relations with the West to the young. On the one hand, the authorities were faced
with those whose calls for greater confrontation might undermine their attempts at
technology transfer and economic integration. On the other, they became
concerned that students and working youth disregarded important ideological
distinctions between economic systems. Accelerated economic integration with
107 On the popular appeal of peaceful revolution, see Iván Harsányi, “A chilei és a dél-
európai baloldal közti kapcsolat és kölcsönhatás,” Múltunk, no. 4 ð2008Þ: 246–47.
108 “A forradalmi harc néhány fontos tapasztalata Latin-Amerikában” ½Some important
experiences of the revolutionary ﬁght in Latin America, Társadalmi Szemle 26, no. 7
ð1971Þ: 52–53. This article argues that Latin American revolutionaries had given up on
violence in 1956 but that it was unfortunately revived in 1959 with the Cuban revolution,
and that its adherents then tried to export this unrealistic model. It presents Chile, in
contrast, as following a realistic peaceful road to socialism without guerrillas. See also this
interpretation in István Kende, “Bevezető,” in Fejlődő országok, 89.
109 Karczag, Che, 163–64.
110 For an ofﬁcial late 1960s position clearly laid out, see István Kende, “Peaceful Co-
existence: Its Interpretation and Misinterpretations,” Journal of Peace Research 5, no. 4
ð1968Þ: 352–63.
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theWest, the socialist version of the market, the increasingly dominant position of
technocrats in both East and West, and common obsessions with the technolog-
ical revolution across the Iron Curtain were being marshaled as evidence of a
convergence between the capitalist and socialist worlds.111 Moreover, Marxist
revisionists within Hungary ðsuch as Ágnes Heller or the young György BenczeÞ,
along with many New Left thinkers in the West, were collapsing distinctions
between socialism and capitalism by arguing that these were merely two similar
forms of modern industrial bureaucratic systems that both resulted in widespread
social alienation and hence required a joint struggle across the Iron Curtain to
reform them.112 Between 1969 and 1974, multiple articles in the popular press
were published that refuted the idea of convergence, for the most part arguing that
the very different systems of ownership and power undercut any superﬁcial
similarities between capitalism and socialism in modern industrial society.113
Elites’ concerns over the difﬁculties faced when communicating their nuanced
positions with regard to international affairs explained another attraction of the
Chilean experiment. Here was an apparently strong anti-imperialist socialist
revolution that did not need radically to confront the Western capitalist world but
rather sought to coexist alongside it, echoing Hungary’s own ideological evolu-
tion. This did not mean that Hungarian elites always had conﬁdence that such a
project would be successful—journals in this period are full of debates over
whether a socialist revolution could survive such an accommodation when it had
not taken state power.114 Nevertheless, Allende’s experiment was an object of
great interest because it served as a proxy for discussing the limits of tolerance
that “international capitalist imperialism” would have for a socialist revolution
and the appropriate limits of accommodation with the Western world.
Chile was fascinating not only to elites; it provided a model of revolution that
was still capable of drawing in the young as well. Many analyses focus on the
Prague Spring as the moment when a socially widespread belief in the possibility
111 Lajos Főcze, a secretary in the Communist Youth League, noted his fears in the
youth journal Young Communist in 1971—namely, that a large number of young techni-
cians and economists now viewed the socialist revolution as something “merely political”
and instead considered the “scientiﬁc-technological revolution” as the “chief characteris-
tic of our age”; see Lajos Főcze, “Young Technicians and Economists,” If jú Kommunista
8–9 ðAugust–September 1971Þ.
112 György Bence, “Marcuse és az újbaloldali diákmozgalom” [Marcuse and the new
left student movement],Új Írás 8 ðSeptember 1968Þ: 95–102; Ágnes Heller, Everyday Life
½originally published asMindennapi élet ð1970; London, 1984Þ, 58; HU OSA 300-40-2,
box 84.
113 For two clearly argued articles in the popular press, see István Darvasi, “Conver-
gence?,” in Magyar Hirlap, September 27, 1970; György Fukász, “Do Differences Fade
Away?,” Népszava, December 2, 1972.
114 See, e.g., István Friss, “Chile útja” ½The Chilean road, Nemzetközi Szemle
7–8 ð1972Þ: 85–93; “Változások Latin-Amerikában,” 79–86.
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of reformed socialism was fatally undermined. These interpretations, however,
ignore the signiﬁcant power that the Chilean revolution had to reactivate the
hopes of a progressive wing of a younger generation.115 Between 1968 and 1973,
in Budapest, Debrecen, and Szeged, newmovements grewwithin the Communist
Youth League that called for universities to democratize and to address the
stagnation in social mobility that they blamed on the regime’s abandonment of
class-based university quotas in 1962. Yet in the late 1960s these movements
were for the most part suspicious of the transnational models that inspired other
activists around them. They still believed in the reformability of socialism and
thought that the creation of the socialist market with the NEM would be the
precursor of a greater political democratization. Thus they had an ambivalent
attitude toward both Western and Hungarian student radicals, identifying with
their criticism of authoritarianism within the university but nevertheless regarding
their rejection of established Communist parties and their excessive public
radicalism as signs of ideological immaturity.116 They held ambivalent views of
the Prague Spring. While interested in its reforms, they had also been suspicious,
worried that the excessive demands of the Czechoslovak reformers would under-
mine their own gradualist approaches in the eyes of Moscow and fearful that
demands for a socialist-dominated multiparty system would not survive “preda-
tory international capitalism.”117 Nor did they seek to domesticate the radical
heroism of the Cuban revolution, Che Guevara, or the Vietnamese struggle: none
of these issues appeared relevant to their goal of responsible and sober institu-
tional democratization of the revolution.118 Rather, they had looked to domestic
traditions, ﬁnding particular inspiration in the brief period of progressive politics
and social mobility that followedWorldWar II before the imposition of Stalinism
in the late 1940s. Chile was the ﬁrst foreign revolution that really appealed to
them. They promoted it at the Eighth Communist Youth congress in December
1971 as the reményteljes út ðthe hope-ﬁlled pathÞ, the lessons from which needed
115 For a further discussion of how it was only in the late 1970s that the Prague Spring
was constructed as a symbol that represented the end of the possibility of reformed so-
cialism, see Apor and Mark, “Mobilizing Generation,” 110–11.
116 Interview with one-time Communist Youth League reformist leader ðand later
deputy mayor of BudapestÞ János Atkári, conducted by James Mark, Budapest, Novem-
ber 12, 2008. KISZ reports of student attitudes in this period also note their “realism” with
regard toWestern student movements; see, e.g., KISZ report, “A fejlett kapitalista országok
megmozdulásairól” ½Concerning the movements in developed capitalist countries, 35, PSL
289/3/252.
117 These reformers are quite typical in this regard. Criticism of the suppression of the
Prague Spring in Hungary in the late 1960s was limited, save for a few well-known
outbursts of protest.
118 On the failure of KISZ to integrate the radical anti-imperialist left in this period, see
György Kalmár, “Az ifjúság politikai beilleszkedése” ½The political integration of youth,
Társadalmi Szemle ðMay 1973Þ: 60–68.
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to be incorporated into KISZ activities nationwide.119 It was a new form of
revolution that did not rely on a violent vanguard role for the working class or
peasantry, and for a short time it appeared to offer the possibility of a consensual
incremental accommodation between parliamentary democracy and socialism that
would be internationally recognized in an era of détente. Chile could be harnessed
to reject the position of older elite conservatives that one-party centralized state so-
cialism was the only possible model—a position that impeded their own democ-
ratizing maneuvers. According to Ferenc Redő, a member of the Eötvös Loránd
University Communist Youth reform movement,
Up until that point it seemed that revolution was necessary for the victory of the working
class or the peasantry—we can include Cuba in this—and then suddenly we were met with
an example—also in South America—where parliamentary elections were fair, according
to rules that the world accepted. That the capitalist world accepted. And so Allende could
try to get on with their program—well, that was great! It was very interesting for us. Be-
cause then I imagined that there wouldn’t have to be “world revolution”—this was clear for
everyone! ½laughs. That a majority of ½the Chilean people had voted for change . . . and
had been able to create their socialist change of direction in this way—that was very
inspiring, and it brought out the ﬁght in me, that perhaps you could do something suc-
cessfully “by the rules.”120
The Chilean revolution was also received positively among more radical
activists. It drew in ultraleftists such as Orfeo, the Maoist-inﬂuenced theater,
puppetry, and music collective that played a prominent role in the experimental
artistic scene of 1970s Hungary.121 Their musicians had discovered the Chilean
road ﬁrst; their group was founded after experiencing a performance by the
radical Chilean folk group Quilapayún at the Berlin political song festival in
February 1971. The group’s initial repertoire included Chilean music from
Quilapayún’s repertoire alongside working-class, New Left, and Hungarian folk
and regional music.122 Unlike the communist youth reformers discussed above,
these activists were much more interested in radical left ﬁgures such as Che
Guevara, Angela Davies, and the Black Panthers. After the Chilean coup, some
members produced a ﬁlm about the fall of Allende; when the Pannónia ﬁlm
119 “Nyilatkozat a latin-amerikai ifjúság harcával vállalt szolidaritásról” ½Statement on
solidarity with the struggle of Latin American youth, Eighth KISZ Congress, December 8,
1971, Budapest. The declaration gave its support to all progressive forces in Latin America,
but it dealt mostly with Cuba and Chile. There were also demonstrations of Latin American
solidarity at the local level; see, e.g., “Székesfehérvár gyűlés: Latin amerikai népekmelletti
szolidaritás” ½Meeting in the city of Székesfehérvár: Solidarity with the peoples of Latin-
America, PSL 289/1/88.
120 Interview with Redő.
121 For background, see Orsolya Ring, “A színjátszás harmadik útja és a hatalom: Az
alternatív Orfeo Együttes kálváriája az 1970-es években,”Múltunk, no. 3 ð2008Þ: 233–57.
122 Orfeo Dokumentumﬁlm, http://www.orfeocsoport.hu/zenekar.html.
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company pulled it due to its ultraleftist political content, production continued at
the more experimental Balázs Béla Filmstúdió.123
IV. The End of the World
The year 1973 was the high water mark for this internationalist anti-imperialist
culture. It was the year of the last great victory over Western imperialism, as the
Paris Peace Accords marked the beginning of the American withdrawal from
Vietnam. On November 6, 1973, on Hungarian television, Minister of Culture
György Aczél could still declare, in a rhetorical ﬂourish, that, “historically speak-
ing only yesterday, that is forty-two years ago, the Hungarian poet Attila József
still described the world as a place where ‘the colonizing empires are devouring
and tearing upAsia, Africa . . . and the gaping yellowmouth of capital is breathing
down upon the small, cowering countries.’ Yet today the small cowering states
have become heroic and victorious Vietnams. . . . ‘The ten days that shook the
world’ unleashed a landslide that destroyed the imperialist colonial empires once
thought impregnable and prepared the historical ground for the establishment of a
new world.”124
Yet it was also the beginning of the end. Elites slowly lost faith in the idea that
these struggles represented a victorious future for socialism that could be inspire
youth and activist cultures. Solidarity with Chile only lasted as long as it appeared
that the junta might be overcome peacefully; by the late 1970s, as Pinochet’s grip
on power tightened, a nationwide campaign that had mobilized very effectively
earlier in the decade went into rapid decline.125 Nor was there conﬁdence that
struggles against imperialism and reaction—especially after the collapse of right-
wing dictatorships in Greece, Spain, and Portugal had led to liberal democracy—
would necessarily lead to socialism anymore.126 Nor were new anticolonial move-
ments deemed relevant to the future of Hungarian socialism: struggles in Yemen,
123 Interviews with Péter Fábry, conducted by James Mark, Budapest, January 23,
2009, and with Anna Komjáthy, conducted by James Mark, January 22, 2009.
124 György Aczél, speech given on the forty-second anniversary of the Russian Rev-
olution, broadcast on Hungarian television, November 6, 1973.
125 James Mark and Bálint Tolmár, “Connecting the Peaceful Roads to Socialism? The
Rise and Fall of a Culture of Chilean Solidarity in Socialist Hungary, 1965–1989,” in Eu-
ropean Solidarity with Chile: 1970s–1980s, ed. Kim Christiaens, Idesbald Goddeeris, and
Magaly Rodriguez Garcia ðBern, 2014Þ, 318.
126 Jerry F. Hough, “The Evolving Soviet Debate on Latin America,” Latin American
Research Review 16, no. 1 ð1981Þ: 138. In September 1974, around the ﬁrst anniversary of
the Chilean coup, Kádár linked the role that the Communists were playing in overthrowing
a right-wing dictatorship in Portugal with the role their brethren might play in returning
Chile to socialism. Before it became clear in the late 1970s that the southern European
transitions would result in liberal democratic systems, it was much easier for Hungarian
elites to argue that state socialist democracy in “Latin countries” might have a future. See
the September 2, 1974, speech by János Kádár, “Beszéd a Politikai Főiskola fennállásának
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Mozambique, and Angola were often led by violent radical movements and thus
had less appeal as appropriate socialist exemplars for a regime that celebrated
“responsible revolution.”
This shift was also a result of the fact that Hungarian socialism’s legitimacy
was being built less on the basis of political ideology and more on the grounds of
technocratic and economic competence. From the mid-1970s, international links
were imagined far more in terms of responsible economic exchange and devel-
opment. From 1974, the leading theoretical journal of the party, Társadalmi
Szemle, focused increasingly on the prospects for socialist economic integration,
economic collaboration with the European Economic Community and the United
States, and international security cooperation.127 Discussions of what was now
increasingly called the “ThirdWorld”—aWestern termwhose usage, even within
scare quotes, signaled an increased mental distancing of this “world” from the
Eastern Bloc—were now taking place mainly in elite economic and diplomatic
journals. Here, the inspiring language of struggle was replaced by a technocratic
vocabulary of responsible exchange and economic integration and by discussions
over how development in postcolonial countries affected the economic world
system and the prospects for global international cooperation.128
A decline in Third Worldism also needs to be understood “from below.” Some
activists traced their declining interest to their abandonment of the struggle for
a socialist future. The defeat of Allende’s revolution abroad, and the clampdown
on nonconformist politics at home with the rise of the hardline “Workers’
Opposition” in the Hungarian Central Committee, appeared in late 1973 to mark
the end of the road for a democratized socialism. József Sipos, one of the leaders
of the communist student reform movement in Szeged, remembered how events
in both Budapest and Santiago led to the withdrawal from meaningful political
127 See, e.g., János Berecz, “Az európai biztonság és a genﬁ konferencia” ½European
security and the Geneva Conference, Társadalmi Szemle, no. 4 ð1974Þ: 79–88; Sándor
Pirityi and Péter Vajda, “Leszerelési fórumok, tárgyalások, kilátások” ½Disarmament
forums, meetings, outlooks, Társadalmi Szemle, no. 5 ð1978Þ: 63–72; Ferenc Nagy, “A
szocialista gazdasági integráció fejlesztésének fontos állomása ðA KGST XXXII.
ülésszakárólÞ” ½An important milestone in the development of socialist economic integra-
tion ð32nd session of the CMEAÞ, Társadalmi Szemle, nos. 8–9 ð1978Þ: 46–54.
128 See, e.g., Ferenc Mádl, “A szocialista országok és a féjlödő országok gazdasági
együttműködésének ð jogiÞ formái” ½ðLegalÞ forms of economic co-operation between
socialist and developing countries, Állam és jogtudomány 25, no. 4 ð1982Þ: 677–719;
András Balogh, “A Harmadik Világ válsága és a nemzetközi kapcsolatok” ½International
connections and the crisis of the Third World, Külpolitika 11 ð1984Þ: 3–14; György
Tolnai, “A szocialista fejlődés elméletének és gyakorlatának jelentősége a ‘Harmadik
Világ’ előrehaladásában” ½The signiﬁcance of the theory and practice of socialist develop-
ment in the advancement of the “ThirdWorld”, Közgazdasági szemle 31 ð1984Þ: 129–40.
25. évfordulója alkalmából rendezett ünnepségben” [Speech delivered at the celebration of
the 25th anniversary of the foundation of the Political Teaching College], in A fejlett
szocialista társadalom építésének útján ðBudapest, 1975Þ, 14–15.
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engagement for many in his generation, who were then absorbed by “the
system”:129
The ’60s, the period until ’73–’74, was a progressive period, and afterwards it was not. . . .
“The system” was then to integrate our generation in their hundreds of thousands.
Meanwhile it all got worse, with the strangling of the New Economic Mechanism and
political democracy, the clamping down on the Marxist Renaissance ½i.e., the Budapest
School around György Lukács, and with Chile and Pinochet, even in an international
context, there wasn’t democracy. It then ½began to seem that it was only possible to get
½socialist power through proletarian dictatorship, that one had to ﬁght in the jungle. . . . It
made me feel terrible, but that was how I felt, on September 11, 1973 ½the date of the
Pinochet coup, that was how we felt, in the new Szeged Communist youth group.130
Other former Third Worldists, such as Miklós Haraszti, moved away from leftist
radicalism and toward liberalism and human rights, as did their counterparts in
Western European countries.131 In so doing, they gave up on the struggles of the
extra-European world.
Global socialism and Third Worldist revolutionary radicalism had little impact
on a new generation of activists in the late 1970s and 1980s. Student groups, civic
organizations, and nonconformist intellectuals no longer criticized ofﬁcial repre-
sentations of the ThirdWorld, nor was their dissent shaped by such concerns. This
was partly because the Communist Youth League, which had played a leading
role in promoting this culture in the 1960s, no longer acted as an incubator for this
ideology. It shifted its attention away from international agitation and, in becom-
ing a party cadre school rather than a political movement, lost the inﬂuence it had
once had over some segments of youth.132 Reporting and commentary on anti-
imperialist movements in party and youth publications—a phenomenon that had
been so important for sustaining an anti-imperialist culture—went into decline.
New critical movements of the 1980s—such as environmental and peace activ-
ism—did not emerge from its structures, as earlier nonconformism had.133
129 There were many examples of this in the oral history testimony we collected. Some
sought to ﬁnd careers free from politics; others sought out professions ðe.g., as psycho-
analysists, in rural education and development, or in economicsÞ where their socially
progressive instincts could still ﬁnd expression.
130 Interview with József Sipos, conducted by Péter Apor, Budapest, October 21, 2008.
131 A story well told in Kristin Ross,May ’68 and Its Afterlives ðChicago, 2002Þ, 158–
60.
132 László Kürti, Youth and State in Hungary: Capitalism, Communism and Class
ðLondon, 2002Þ, 170, 179.
133 See, e.g., Eszter Zsóﬁa Tóth, “A szombathelyi Dialógus békemozgalom,” http://
www.boldogsag.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21788:a-szom
bathelyi-dialogus-bekemozgalom&catid=1099:joevronto-koezelmult&Itemid=721. See
also the dominance of noninstitutional oppositional activity related in Padraic Kenney, A
Carnival of Revolution: Central Europe 1989 ðPrinceton, NJ, 2002Þ.
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Moreover, the international imagination of both elites and critics of the regime
shifted. From the mid-1970s onward, major party and Communist Youth League
publications focused on European issues, particularly the necessity for economic
and political cooperation. Such discussions repositioned Hungary in the interna-
tional system as a responsible partner in the maintenance of European security.
Student activist groups, civic organizations, and nonconformist intellectuals
frequently challenged the party leadership and the government’s claim to repre-
sent Hungary in Europe, claiming that the country had been snatched away from
the continent’s traditions by an alien Eastern communist experiment. The idea of a
“return to Europe” became the rallying cry that brought together a broad spec-
trum of cultural, political, and social criticism of the communist state.134 Yet an
interest in global revolutionary confrontation did not disappear entirely: solidarity
movements supporting causes in places such as Nicaragua, Grenada, and south-
ern Africa continued throughout the 1980s. Nevertheless, these had an increasingly
marginal position for elites, took on increasingly routinized and empty forms in
practice, and had less and less real meaning for intellectual and political cultures.
These internationalist political subjectivities that had been forged in the 1960s
did not disappear overnight, however. The values of anti-imperialism and anti-
capitalism that had been crucial in generating a fascination with the Third World
were instrumental in framing new political and cultural objectives for some
activists in the 1970s and 1980s, albeit in revised forms. Some who had initially
embraced Third Worldism as an expression of sympathy with small nations
against Great Powers transferred their support to “the oppressed” closer to home.
From the late 1970s, the populist intellectual Sándor Csoóri took up the cause of
Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries, encouraging the communist
leadership in Budapest to represent their interests more forcefully in the face of
nationalist discrimination, particularly in Transylvania.135 He framed his advo-
cacy in terms of the protection of defenseless peoples against the destructive
might of an imperialist will to rule.136 The necessity of protecting national peasant
cultures—an interest that had once taken him to Cuba—led him, following the
collapse of state socialism, to play a role in populist politics as an inﬂuential
134 See, e.g., Csizmadia, Diskurzus és diktatúra, 71–81.
135 The route from Third Worldism to the protection of Hungarian minorities and
marginalized peasant culture abroad was shared by a number of interviewees—for exam-
ple, József Sipos, once a great supporter of Allende’s peaceful revolution, who became one
of the most important defenders of the rural working class in postsocialist Hungary as both
president of the nongovernmental organization the Imre Nagy Society and as a member of
parliament ðinterview with SiposÞ; see also József Sipos, “A polgári demokráciát én
mindig is igeneltem,” Egyetem 7 ðMarch 2005Þ: 1–3.
136 Csoóri still spoke out against great power imperialism. On a panel at the forty-eighth
PEN congress in New York in March 1986, he found himself with on a panel with a
Nicaraguan leftist discussing the impact that the imperialism of the Soviets in Eastern
Europe and of the United States in Central America had on the growth of “authentic”
national identity. It is not recorded whether they agreed with each other.
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intellectual within the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the conservative party that
won the ﬁrst free elections in 1990.137
By the late 1970s, in the midst of a serious debt crisis, reform-minded elites
became interested in the economic transformation of so-called semiperipheral
countries that had seemingly effectively responded to an increasingly intercon-
nected and interdependent world order—evidence itself of the shift away from
the Manichean construction of a capitalist versus socialist world order that had
sustained an earlier anti-imperialist engagement.138 Reformists such as Iván
Berend argued that politicians needed to look to the way in which Spain and the
East Asian “tigers” had successfully effected the transformation of their econo-
mies by opening up to the pressures of the world market.139 For Károly Grósz,
who became prime minister in 1987, the South Korean model of authoritarian
state-centered “guided” capitalism was particularly appealing as he sought eco-
nomic reform while maintaining the hegemony of the Hungarian Socialist Work-
ers’ Party.140 In spring 1988, reform-minded Communists such as Rezső Nyers,
who advocated a limited pluralism and were considering further market reforms
but had yet to accept liberal constitutionalism, were investigating the performance
of “medium-developed” countries “like us” who had recently “extricated them-
selves from their previously difﬁcult situations.” In this regard, he referenced East
Asia and the Latin American success stories such as Brazil, Argentina, and
Chile.141 Another reformer, Imre Pozsgay, admitted that some right-wing author-
itarian regimes, such as those of Franco or Pinochet, had survived because of their
137 See Csoóri’s collections of essays Nappali Hold ½Diurnal moon/Moon of the day
ðBudapest, 1991Þ, and Elveszett utak ½Lost roads ðBudapest, 2003Þ.
138 It was in 1977 that János Kádár and top economic elites ﬁnally accepted this new
model of engagement with a broader world economy and began to view the idea of fealty
to a socialist world as having less and less substance: Pál Germuska, “Failed Eastern
Integration and a Partly Successful Opening Up to theWest: The Economic Re-orientation
of Hungary during the 1970s,” European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire
21, no. 2 ð2014Þ: 278. For interdependence and reform-minded intellectuals, see, e.g.,
József Bognár, The Global Problems in an Interdependent World ðBudapest, 1984Þ.
139 On the idea of semiperipheries and integration in Europe, see Iván T. Berend and
György Ránki, The European Periphery and Industrialization 1780–1914 ðCambridge,
1982Þ, especially the introduction. On how Hungary could integrate into the world
economy on the basis on these historical lessons, see Iván T. Berend, “Mai gazdaságpo-
litikánk történelmi összefüggésben” ½On the historical context of our economic policy
today, inÖt előadás gazdaságról és oktatásról ½Five lectures on economics and education
ðBudapest: 1978Þ, esp. 210–25.
140 Stephen Kotkin, “The Kiss of Debt: The Eastern Bloc Goes Borrowing,” in The
Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, ed. Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez
Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent ðCambridge, MA, 2010Þ, 92.
141 RezsőNyers, “Assesses Current Policy Tasks,”Népszabadság, January 21, 1989, 5.
In the same interview, he advocated setting up, within the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance, a central European “Benelux-type group” with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia,
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economic achievements.142 As socialist elites slowly accepted the necessity of
multiparty democracy and a liberalized economy during the course of 1989, they
began asking whether dictatorship might eventually act as a brake on economic
development. Such ideas could be more easily articulated through discussions
about right-wing authoritarian regimes in Latin America, but they had equally
clear implications for one-party rule at home.143 Members of the democratic
opposition, who had appealed for a return to Europe for most of the decade, also
looked further aﬁeld in 1989. In their samizdat periodical Beszélő, they argued
that the economic success of East Asia in general, and of South Korea in par-
ticular, could be a model for the transformation in Hungary. Downplaying the
authoritarianism of South Korea before 1987, they tried instead to connect the
contemporary economic successes of the country with its recent experience of
democratization and argued that Hungary had much to learn from this model.144
Various groups were now framing democratization as a necessity for economic
progress, drawing examples from world regions that in previous decades had
been central to the country’s anti-imperialist imagination.
V. Conclusion
An anti-imperialist internationalism played a large role in elite, intellectual, and
everyday socialist culture of the 1960s and 1970s. From the late 1950s, state-
sponsored public media, educational institutions, and publishers promoted the
struggles of the decolonizing world to communicate an important set of interna-
tionalist values that could, they hoped, inspire a commitment to socialism among a
new generation and build an outward-looking socialist patriotism that would
counter the effects of so-called bourgeois nationalism. Yet this late socialist
transnational imaginary cannot be reduced to the mere tool of state institutions.
142 Imre Pozsgay, “The Chances for Freedom,”Március Tizenötödike, March 15, 1989,
1–2.
143 “OfﬁcialsDiscuss Foreign PolicyRe-orientation,”MagyarNemzet,March 18, 1989,
4–5.
144 László Zuglói, “Mit tanuljunk Ázsiától?” ½What should we learn from Asia?, in
Beszélő összkiadás, ed. Fanny Havas ðBudapest, 1992Þ, 722–23.
and possibly Poland. He believed that market socialist ideas were already more advanced
within this group and that broader solutions drawn from the world economy could be
realistically considered. South Korea as a model for economic transformation was consid-
ered in the early 1980s by the Institute for World Economics, and it emerged in more
developed projects toward the end of the decade; see, e.g., Sándor Sipos, Small and
Medium Enterprises in Industrial Development: A Comparative Analysis of Hungary and
South Korea ðBudapest, 1988Þ. It was a model of successful authoritarian modernization
and integration into the global economy that appealed to those hardline communist
reformers, such as Károly Grósz, who wanted economic revitalization without democra-
tization. See, e.g., Kotkin, “Kiss of Debt,” 92.
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Groups with a variety of ideological outlooks also contributed to the rise of this
new culture, with visions that were often critical of the socialist status quo in
Hungary. The capacity of foreign revolutions to offer politically inappropriate and
disruptive exemplars was a matter of great concern to the socialist authorities
throughout this period and required regular work of interpretation, criticism, and—
at times—punishment in order to mitigate its potentially harmful effects. From the
mid-1970s, however, this elite-led promotion of global revolution went into de-
cline as the extra-European world failed to produce models that spoke to the
future of Hungarian socialism and as elites turned to technocratic arguments to
legitimate their power. A broader social and cultural fascination was on the wane
too: in the last decade and a half of state socialism, Third World issues played
very little role in the generation of new critical cultures.
After 1989, postcommunist governments turned their attention toward gaining
membership in European and Atlantic organizations and toward improving rela-
tions with neighboring countries. Hungary withdrew from areas such as sub-
Saharan Africa where it hadmaintained a presence. Domestically, extra-European
internationalism was often negatively associated with the leftist engagement of
the former state socialist era.145 However, from 2010, the conservative and anti-
communist FIDESZ administration adopted a policy of “global opening”
ðglobális nyitásÞ. To balance not only declining economic growth within Europe
but also a perceived Western liberal cultural imperialism from the European
Union, it encouraged the intensiﬁcation of educational and economic links
between Hungary and East Asia and Africa—and, with that, the relationships
that had been forged in the late socialist period began to be rediscovered.146
145 István Tarrósy and Péter Morenth, “Hungarian Africa Policy,” African Studies
Quarterly 14, nos. 1–2 ðNovember 2013Þ: 77–78, 81.
146 As the African Union Commission chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma noted at
the Budapest Africa Forum in June 2013, “Hungary and other Central and Eastern
European countries played an important role during our anti-colonial struggles and our
early years of nation formation and state building in the development of African human
capital, with many of our leaders and professionals passing through your universities”
ðibid., 89Þ. On the revived fascination with authoritarian modernization and its links to the
earlier interest in the East Asian statist tiger models, see, e.g., András Mink, “A felfüg-
gesztett alkotmány,” Beszélő 16, no. 4 ðApril 2011Þ, http://beszelo.c3.hu/cikkek/a-felfueg
gesztett-alkotmany; Chris Moreh, “The Asianization of National Fantasies in Hungary: A
Critical Analysis of Political Discourse,” International Journal of Cultural Studies, March 13,
2015, http://ics.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/03/12/1367877915573781.refs.
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